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INTRODUCTION
Months prior to the 2015 public disclosure of a data breach at the
U.S. government’s Office of Personnel and Management (OPM), the Office
of the Inspector General for OPM issued a report that identified significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses in a number of the agency’s
information systems and IT security programs.1 In response to the 2020
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Lawyering Skills,
Penn State Dickinson Law. © 2021, Amy C. Gaudion. This article benefited greatly
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SolarWinds supply chain2 hack, attributed to Russia, calls are underway for
inspectors general to conduct audits and inspections and to review prior
inspector general assessments of information systems and vulnerabilities at
federal agencies.3 The use of inspectors general to assess information
system vulnerabilities and to conduct post-breach evaluations, as illustrated
by the OPM and SolarWinds cyber incidents, reflect a shift in the work
undertaken by inspectors general and hint at their ability to fill an important
role in efforts to reform the U.S. government’s cybersecurity architecture.
This article examines the unheralded and unrecognized work of inspectors
general and the special role they are poised to play in the U.S.

from the feedback of my fellow participants at the Belmont Law Review
Symposium, held in January 2021. I am grateful to Emily Kortright for her
excellent research assistance and the good humor she brings to every task, and I
want to thank the staff of the The Belmont Law Review for their terrific editorial
work.
1. U.S. OFF. OF PERSONNEL AND MGMT., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
FINAL AUDIT REPORT: FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT ACT
AUDIT FY 2014, (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.opm.gov/our-inspector-general/
publications/reports/2014/federal-information-security-management-act-audit-fy-2
014-4a-ci-00-14-016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BFC-ZQW7]; Brendan I. Koerner,
Inside the Cyberattack that Shocked the US Government, WIRED (Oct. 23, 2016,
5:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-us-govern
ment/ [https://perma.cc/5DNL-QYF9]; Brian Krebs, Catching Up on the OPM
Breach, KREBS ON SECURITY (June 15, 2015, 11:25 AM), https://krebson
security.com/2015/06/catching-up-on-the-opm-breach/ [https://perma.cc/F8BN-C9
52].
2. I will use the label “SolarWinds” to describe this incident, while
recognizing that SolarWinds is only one of several attack vectors used by the threat
actors. See, e.g., Risky Business #611 -- MalwareBytes the latest “Holiday Bear”
victim, RISKY BUS. (Jan. 20, 2021), https://risky.biz/RB611/ [https://perma.cc/
ZUZ8-G6T5]; Supply Chain Compromise, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY AGENCY, https://www.cisa.gov/supply-chain-compromise [https://perma.
cc/L4MU-XBJU] (last visited Jun. 13, 2021).
3. Naomi Jagoda, Lawmakers Ask IRS if Its Systems Were Compromised in
SolarWinds Hack, THE HILL (Dec. 18, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/
530935-lawmakers-ask-irs-if-its-systems-were-compromised-in-solarwinds-hack
[https://perma.cc/YL7B-Y3EE]; Dave Nyczepir, “No Evidence” IRS Taxpayer
Information Exposed by SolarWinds Hack, FEDSCOOP (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://www.fedscoop.com/taxpayer-information-solarwinds-hack-irs/ [https://perm
a.cc/Q8UP-6FZT]; Dustin Volz & Richard Rubin, Senators Press IRS for
SolarWinds Hack Briefing, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2020, 11:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/senators-press-irs-for-solarwinds-hack-briefing-1160
8220822 [https://perma.cc/KA5G-2RX4]; Eric White, Senators Want Answers
Regarding SolarWinds Cyber Attack, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 16, 2020, 11:41
AM),
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/federal-newscast/2020/12/senators-wantanswers-regarding-solarwinds-cyber-attack/ [https://perma.cc/ERN5-SLFT].
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government’s cybersecurity-4related work in the coming years. Inspectors
general serve critical but little-understood functions in our constitutional
system, both as internal checks on executive power within the
administrative state and as conduits of the information necessary to the
congressional oversight task. In light of continuing calls for reform of the
U.S. government’s cybersecurity architecture, this article examines the
consequential position of the inspector general from a new perspective and
considers the unique contributions of inspectors general to these reform
efforts.
Part I identifies flaws in the current organization of the U.S.
government’s cybersecurity efforts. It describes the current fractured
structure as reflected by more than twenty-three executive branch entities
responsible for cybersecurity-related tasks, a disjointed congressional
committee structure, and inadequate coordination with private sector
partners. Part II explores the common solutions offered to remedy the
government’s cybersecurity organizational challenges. These include calls
for revising the national cyber strategy, establishing a new cyber director,
strengthening the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and
increasing its funding, revamping the congressional committee structure,
and building a cyber workforce. Notably absent from these calls is
recognition that inspectors general have been examining these very issues
and offering recommendations. Part III calls attention to the oft-ignored
contributions of inspectors general, and examines why inspectors general
across the U.S. government are uniquely prepared to support a re-alignment
of the government’s cybersecurity-related programs and entities. Part IV
catalogs examples of inspectors general already engaged in the work of
identifying and evaluating cybersecurity challenges. In conclusion, Part V
considers how to effectively engage inspectors general in future reorganizational efforts and suggests avenues for further research.
I. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S CYBERSECURITY ORGANIZATIONAL
PROBLEM
In describing the current cybersecurity organization of the U.S.
government, the March 2020 report of the Cyberspace Solarium
Commission offered this warning:

4. This Article focuses on the role that inspectors general play in the
allocation of defensive cyber responsibilities, or cybersecurity, across the U.S.
government. Different considerations and dynamics are involved in examining the
role of inspectors general in assessing the U.S. government’s organization of its
offensive cyber capabilities, spread predominantly across intelligence, defense, and
law enforcement entities. Of course, the line between cyber offense and defense is
a blurry one and there will be areas of overlap.
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While cyberspace has transformed the American economy
and society, the government has not kept up. Existing
government structures and jurisdictional boundaries
fracture cyber policymaking processes, limit opportunities
for government action, and impede cyber operations.5
Of course, the Commission is not the first entity to note this
problem nor the first to call for a government restructuring in response.
Many commentators have examined the roots of the U.S.
government’s inability to effectively address cyber-related threats and
risks.6 The SolarWinds hack is only the most recent illustration of this
defect. This section describes failings in the current cybersecurity
architecture and explains how the current organization is an inappropriate
fit for the cybersecurity task at hand. The challenges fall into three buckets:
the dispersion of cybersecurity responsibilities and tasks across twentythree executive branch entities; a disjointed congressional committee
structure; and the persistent problem of inadequate coordination and
information sharing with the private sector.
A. The Dispersion of Cybersecurity Responsibilities Across the
Executive Branch
The first and most common explanation offered for the overall level
of disorganization of U.S. cybersecurity is the dispersion of cybersecurity
responsibilities across the executive branch.7 This dispersion leads to a lack
5. U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N, CSC FINAL REPORT (2020)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ryMCIL_dZ30QyjFqFkkf10MxIXJGT4yv/view
[https://perma.cc/GMK2-3H7R] [hereinafter CSC FINAL REPORT].
6. CSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-20-629, CYBERSECURITY: CLARITY OF LEADERSHIP URGENTLY NEEDED TO
FULLY IMPLEMENT THE NATIONAL STRATEGY (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
710/709555.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZF4-NT4D] [hereinafter GAO-20-629]; U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-157SP, HIGH RISK SERIES: SUBSTANTIAL
EFFORTS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE GREATER PROGRESS ON HIGH RISK AREAS (2019),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/697245.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW8D-9NEV]; OFF.
OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY
RISK DETERMINATION REPORT AND ACTION PLAN 6 (May 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Cybersecurity-Risk-Dete
rmination-Report-FINAL_May-2018-Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TEU-HV5G]
(“Agencies do not understand and do not have the resources to combat the current
threat environment.”); MICHAEL CHERTOFF, EXPLODING DATA: RECLAIMING OUR
CYBER SECURITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2018); RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT
KNAKE, THE FIFTH DOMAIN: DEFENDING OUR COUNTRY, OUR COMPANIES, AND
OURSELVES IN THE AGE OF CYBER THREATS (2019) [hereinafter CLARKE &
KNAKE].
7. GAO-20-629, supra note 6, at 34.
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of clarity as to who is responsible for leading and coordinating the various
cyber defense tasks within the federal government.8 Bluntly put, it is
unclear who answers calls to the U.S. government’s cyber help desk. The
title of a September 2020 report, prepared by the Governmental
Accountability Office frames the challenge in stark terms:
“CYBERSECURITY: Clarity of Leadership Urgently Needed to Fully
Implement the National Strategy.”9 The report painstakingly catalogs the
twenty-three federal entities that have “roles and responsibilities for
developing policies, monitoring critical infrastructure protection efforts,
sharing information to enhance cybersecurity across the nation, responding
to cyber incidents, investigating cyberattacks, and conducting
cybersecurity-related research.”10 The executive branch entities can be
grouped into the following categories: executive offices of the President,
departments, agencies, commissions, and other offices. The following list
gives a sense of the scale of the dispersion:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Executive Offices of the President11
Presidential Advisory Committees12
Central Intelligence Agency13
Department of Agriculture14
Department of Commerce15
Department of Defense16

8. Id. at 33.
9. See generally id.
10. Id. at 17.
11. Id. at 42. The cybersecurity-related components in the Executive Offices
of the President include the National Security Council, Office of Management and
Budget, and Office of Science and Technology Policy.
12. Id. at 42–43. The cybersecurity-related presidential committees include
the National Science and Technology Council, President’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology, and President’s National Security Telecommunications
Advisory Committee.
13. Id. at 43. The cybersecurity-related roles and responsibilities of the
Central Intelligence Agency include providing expertise in collaboration with other
federal agencies for analysis and warning, information sharing, vulnerability
reduction, mitigation, and critical infrastructure information systems’ incident
recovery activities.
14. Id. at 56. The cybersecurity-related component in the Department of
Agriculture is the Office of Homeland Security.
15. Id. at 43. The cybersecurity-related components in the Department of
Commerce include the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration.
16. Id. at 44–45. The cybersecurity-related components in the Department of
Defense include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Information
Systems Agency, DoD Chief Information Officer, DoD Components, DoD Cyber
Crime Center, Geographic Combatant Commands, National Guard Bureau,
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Department of Energy17
Department of Health and Human Services18
Department of Homeland Security19
Department of Justice20
Department of State21
Department of Transportation22
Department of the Treasury23
Environmental Protection Agency24
Federal Chief Information Officers Council25

National Security Agency, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
Principal Cyber Advisor, and U.S. Cyber Command.
17. Id. at 46. The cybersecurity-related components in the Department of
Energy are the National Laboratories, and the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy
Security, and Emergency Response.
18. Id. The cybersecurity-related components in the Department of Health and
Human Services are the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response, Food and Drug Administration, Office of the Chief Information Officer,
and Office for Civil Rights.
19. Id. at 47–49. The cybersecurity-related components in the Department of
Homeland Security are the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Transportation Security Administration,
U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Secret
Service.
20. Id. at 49–50. The cybersecurity-related components in the Department of
Justice are the Criminal Division, Drug Enforcement Agency, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, INTERPOL Washington, and National Security Division.
21. Id. at 50. The cybersecurity-related components in the Department of State
are the Bureau of Counterterrorism, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Bureau
of International Organization Affairs, Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues,
Office of the Legal Advisor, and Regional Bureaus.
22. Id. at 51. The cybersecurity-related components in the Department of
Transportation are the Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Highway
Administration, Maritime Administration, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology,
and Office of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response.
23. Id. The cybersecurity-related components in the Department of Treasury
are the Office of Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection, and the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
24. Id. at 52. The cybersecurity-related components in the Environmental
Protection Agency are the Office of Homeland Security, Office of Research and
Development, and the Office of Water.
25. Id. The cybersecurity-related roles and responsibilities of the Federal
Chief Information Officers council are leveraging the Federal Information Security
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Federal Communications Commissions26
General Services Administration27
National Science Foundation28
Office of the Director of National Intelligence 29

A more granular view of the challenges created by the dispersion of cyber
responsibilities across the executive branch can be found in the variety of
reports prepared by inspectors general.30
There have been prior efforts to lessen the confusion and improve
coordination among executive branch entities, and two deserve mention
here. First, President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 4131 in
2016. The directive outlines the federal government’s response plan for
cyber incidents involving either the government or the private sector.32 For
certain types of incidents, those designated as “significant cyber incidents,”
the directive establishes “lead Federal agencies and an architecture for
coordinating the broader Federal Government response.”33 Second,
Congress passed the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act
Modernization Act (2014) quarterly reporting and cybersecurity budget
enhancements to meet federal cybersecurity priorities.
26. Id. at 52–53. The cybersecurity-related components in the Federal
Communications Commission are the Communications Security, Reliability and
Interoperability Council, International Bureau, Public Safety and Homeland
Security, Wireline Competition Bureau, and Wireless Telecommunications Bureau.
27. Id. at 53. The cybersecurity-related components in the General Services
Administration are the Federal Acquisition Service – Office of Information
Technology Category, Office of Government-Wide Policy, and Office of Mission
Assurance.
28. Id. at 54–55. The cybersecurity-related components in the National
Science Foundation are Computer and Information Science and Engineering,
Education and Human Resources, Engineering, and Mathematical and Physical
Sciences.
29. Id. at 55. The cybersecurity-related components in the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence are the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration
Center; Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer, Intelligence
Community – Security Coordination Center, National Aviation Intelligence –
Integration Office, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, National
Intelligence Manager for Cyber, National Intelligence Manager for Space and
Technical Intelligence, National Intelligence Officer for Cyber, and National
Maritime Intelligence – Integration Office.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. Presidential Policy Directive 41 on United States Cyber Incident
Coordination, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC., DCPD No. 00495 (July 26, 2016),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201600495/pdf/DCPD-201600495.
pdf [https://perma.cc/63EN-P6VE] [hereinafter PPD-41].
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1.
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of 201834, which President Trump signed into law in November 2018. The
Act established the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA) as a new entity within the Department of Homeland Security,
although drawn from prior entities within the department. While these
efforts helped to clarify who answers the calls to the “cyber help desk,” at
least for most U.S. government networks,35 the problems persist.
Cybersecurity defense in practice remains piecemeal across the
executive branch, systems lack integration, and threat information is often
not effectively distributed within federal agencies or with the private
sector.36 In a February 2021 hearing before the Committee for Homeland
Security in the House of Representatives, former CISA Director Chris
Krebs offered a sobering assessment of the continuing impacts of the
executive branch’s disorganization:
At the governance level, roles and responsibilities across
the Federal government are unclear, potentially further
complicated by the newly authorized National Cyber
Director (NCD) created by Section 1752 of the NDAA.
Regardless of the organizational structure, the Executive
branch must establish a comprehensive strategy and vision
for Federal network modernization and security, drawing in
the Budget side of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to coordinate and consolidate budgetary oversight,
the Federal CISO as the policy framer, CISA as the tool
provider and enforcer of security policy. The respective
roles and responsibilities of the Federal CISO and CISA
should also be examined. 37
Thus, the dispersion of cybersecurity responsibilities across the
executive branch remains a challenge without an easy solution.
34. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018, Pub. L.
115-278, 132 Stat. 4168 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 6 of the
United States Code).
35. CISA’s mandate is limited to federal civilian agencies, while the defense
and intelligence agency networks are excluded from CISA’s jurisdiction. See CISA
Gateway Consolidated Help Desk, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
AGENCY, https://www.cisa.gov/cisa-gateway-consolidated-help-desk#:~:text=The
%20CISA%20Gateway%2FPCIIMS%20Help,and%207%20PM%20(ET) [https://
perma.cc/7679-PLCG] (last visited Jun. 15, 2021).
36. CSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 31.
37. Homeland Cybersecurity: Assessing Cyber Threats and Building
Resilience: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. (2021),
https://homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/homeland-cybersecurity-assessingcyber-threats-and-building-resilience [https://perma.cc/JBB5-UEK5] [hereinafter
Homeland Cybersecurity].
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B. A Disjointed Congressional Committee Structure
A second problem is the disjointed congressional committee
structure for oversight of the U.S. government’s cyber-related activities,
both defensive and offensive. Carrie Cordero, former government official,
calls this the “Patchwork Mismatch.”38 There are no committees focused
solely or entirely on cybersecurity matters.39 Rather, oversight of cyberrelated responsibilities and capabilities are divided among many
committees and sub-committees.40
The House and Senate committees on the judiciary consider issues
relating to surveillance, cybercrime, and privacy.41 The armed services
committees in each chamber consider the military’s use of cyber
capabilities, for both offensive and defensive purposes.42 The intelligence
committees focus on the use of cyber capabilities for intelligence gathering,
covert action operations, and counterintelligence activities, as well as
considering the ability of foreign adversaries to use cyber tools in support

38. Carrie Cordero & David Thaw, Rebooting Congressional Cybersecurity
Oversight, CTR. FOR NEW AM. SEC. (Jan. 30. 2020), https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/rebooting-congressional-cybersecurity-oversight [https://perma
.cc/G8U5-G4ET] [hereinafter Rebooting Oversight]; Carrie Cordero & David
Thaw, The Cyberspace Solarium Commission’s Mandate to Fix Congressional
Oversight, LAWFARE (Mar. 18, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
cyberspace-solarium-commissions-mandate-fix-congressional-oversight [https://per
ma.cc/L6N9-SC3K] [hereinafter Cyberspace Mandate].
39. Rebooting Oversight, supra note 38; Cyberspace Mandate, supra note 38.
40. Rebooting Oversight, supra note 38; Cyberspace Mandate, supra note 38.
41. Rebooting Oversight, supra note 38. Recent examples of hearings before
the judiciary committees include: The EARN IT Act: Holding the Tech Industry
Accountable in the Fight Against Online Child Sexual Exploitation: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-earn-it-act-holding-the-techindustry-accountable-in-the-fight-against-online-child-sexual-exploitation
[https://perma.cc/HF9B-2W4M]; Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020),
https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2780 [https://perma
.cc/7SRA-78ML].
42. Rebooting Oversight, supra note 38. Recent examples of hearings before
the armed services committees include: Interim Review of the National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence Effort and Recommendations: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Intel. and Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the H.
Comm. on Armed Serv., 116th Cong. (2020), https://armedservices.house.gov/
hearings?ID=70C87ECC-DF3E-4B34-A8C7-CA9EE8B70B3A [https://perma.cc/E
JJ2-WZ8Q]; Department of Defense Cyber Operations: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Cybersecurity of the S. Comm. on Armed Serv., 116th Cong. (2020),
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/20-03-03-department-of-defensecyber-operations [https://perma.cc/9VUP-TDPJ].
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of election interference efforts.43 The committees on homeland security and
governmental affairs consider cybersecurity issues relating to critical
infrastructure, incident response, election security, and private sector
coordination.44 For example, the SolarWinds hack featured prominently in a
February 2021 hearing before the House Committee on Homeland
Security.45 And the list goes on as the committees focused on agriculture,
commerce, energy, and transportation also come into regular contact with
cybersecurity-related matters in their purview.46 Moreover, this brief
summary does not include the numerous subcommittees that have
jurisdiction over cybersecurity-related matters.47
This trend toward committee overload is not slowing. The most
recent addition to the cybersecurity congressional committee list was
announced in February 2021, when the 117th Congress formally convened
the Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and Information
Systems (CITI)48 under the House Armed Services Committee. The new
43. Rebooting Oversight, supra note 38. Recent examples of hearings before
the intelligence committees include: Misinformation, Conspiracy Theories, and
“Infodemics”: Stopping the Spread Online: Hearing Before the H. Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2020), https://docs.house.gov/
Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=111087 [https://perma.cc/34K7-RRP
B]; Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intel., 116th Cong.
(2019), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-worldwide-thre
ats [https://perma.cc/RW3F-39GU].
44. Rebooting Oversight, supra note 38. Recent examples of hearings before
the homeland security and governmental oversight committees include: Secure,
Safe, and Auditable: Protecting the Integrity of the 2020 Elections: Hearing before
the Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, & Innovation of the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. (2020), https://homeland.house.gov/
activities/hearings/secure-safe-and-auditable-protecting-the-integrity-of-the-2020elections [https://perma.cc/ULL9-36Z2]; Evolving the U.S. Cybersecurity Strategy
and Posture: Reviewing the Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/evolving-the-us-cybersecurity-strategy-and-posturereviewing-the-cyberspace-solarium-commission-report [https://perma.cc/W7W9-Q
LHF].
45. The 2021 hearing featured Chris Krebs, Former Director of the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Sue Gordon, Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Michael Daniel, President & CEO,
Cyber Threat Alliance, and Dmitri Alperovitch, Executive Chairman, Silverado
Policy Accelerator. Homeland Cybersecurity, supra note 37.
46. GAO-20-629, supra note 6, at 41, 43, 51, 56.
47. Simon Handler, The 5x5—Cybersecurity and the 117th Congress,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/
the-5x5/cybersecurity-and-the-117th-congress/ [https://perma.cc/5ZKD-AKYG].
48. Press Release, House Armed Services Committee, Smith, Langevin
Announce New Subcommittee for the 117th Congress (Feb. 3, 2021),
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subcommittee holds jurisdiction over: cybersecurity, operations, and forces;
information technology, systems, and operations; science and technology
programs and policy; defense-wide research and development (except
missile defense and space); artificial intelligence policy and programs;
electromagnetic spectrum policy; electronic warfare policy; and computer
software acquisition policy.49
Committee overlap and shared jurisdiction provide certain
advantages to the congressional oversight scheme.50 However, the current
structure has moved well past the beneficial tipping point. The dispersion
and disjointed nature of the committee structure for cybersecurity is causing
significantly more harm than good.51 Each committee views the
cybersecurity issue only through the narrow lens before it, and thus,
Congress is unable to distinguish the cybersecurity forest from the trees. As
stated by Carrie Cordero, “the lack of a coordinating function among these
committees limits Congress’ ability to obtain a comprehensive picture of
the cybersecurity problem.”52 The Cyberspace Solarium Commission
(CSC) Final Report offers a similarly blunt assessment, noting that the
disjointed nature of the current committee structure “prevents Congress
from effectively providing strategic oversight of the executive branch’s
cybersecurity efforts or exerting its traditional oversight authority for
executive action and policy in cyberspace.”53
A summary of congressional hearings held across only a fourmonth period (February to May 2021) reveals the current fractured
congressional structure. On February 10, 2021, the House Committee on
Homeland Security held a hearing on “Assessing Cyber Threats and
Building Resilience.”54 On February 23, 2021, the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence held a hearing on “Hack of U.S. Networks by a Foreign
Adversary,”55 the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Cyber,
https://armedservices.house.gov/press-releases?ID=283E9BE0-65B6-4C61-880A40E0C7CBD521&utm_campaign=wp_the_cybersecurity_202&utm_medium=ema
il&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_cybersecurity202 [https://perma.cc/9RWN6QBJ].
49. Id.
50. CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30240,
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL, at 5; 39–40 (Mar. 31, 2021), https://fas.org
/sgp/crs/misc/RL30240.pdf [https://perma.cc/TF55-C28E] (describing shared yet
independent authority of committees in both chambers to conduct oversight); see
also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L. REV. 2314, 2324–27 (2014)
(describing benefits of bureaucratic overlap and agency redundancy).
51. Rebooting Oversight, supra note 38; Handler, supra note 47.
52. Cyberspace Mandate, supra note 38.
53. CSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 35.
54. Homeland Cybersecurity, supra note 37.
55. Hearing on the Hack of U.S. Networks by a Foreign Adversary: Hearing
Before the Select Comm. on Intel., 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.intelligence.
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Innovative Technologies and Information Systems held a hearing on
“Innovation Opportunities and Vision for the Science and Technology
Enterprise,”56 and the Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing on
“Emerging Technologies and their Impact on National Security.”57 On
February 26, 2021, the House Homeland Security Committee held a hearing
on “The Role of Private Tech in the SolarWinds Breach and the Ongoing
Campaign.”58 On March 10, 2021, the House Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security held a hearing on
“Modernizing the Federal Civil Approach to Cybersecurity.”59 On March
12, 2021, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative
Technologies and Information Systems and the House Oversight and
Reform Subcommittee on National Security held a joint hearing on the
“Recommendations of the National Security Commission on Artificial
Intelligence.” 60 On April 21, 2021, the House Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Communications and Technology held a hearing on
“Securing American Network Technology”61 and the Senate Armed
Services Committee held a hearing on “The Current and Future Cyber

senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-hearing-hack-us-networks-foreign-adversary
[https://perma.cc/KN5H-E8AK].
56. Innovation Opportunities and Vision for the Science and Technology
Enterprise: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cyber, Innovative Techs., and Info.
Sys., 117th Cong. (2021), https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings?ID=706C682F
-ECFC-40CD-B0D9-87A46C7BD3B3 [https://perma.cc/M2AL-FG6K].
57. Emerging Technologies and Their Impact on National Security, Hearing
Before the Comm. on Armed Serv., 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/hearings/21-02-23-emerging-technologies-and-their-impact-onnational-security [https://perma.cc/YR2Y-JC59].
58. Weathering the Storm: The Role of Private Tech in The SolarWinds
Breach and the Ongoing Campaign, Hearing Before the Comm. on Homeland Sec.,
117th Cong. (2021), https://homeland.house.gov/weathering-the-storm-the-role-ofprivate-tech-in-the-solarwinds-breach-and-the-ongoing-campaign [https://perma.cc/
9QU9-V4ZW].
59. Modernizing the Federal Civilian Approach to Cybersecurity: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Homeland Sec., 117th Cong. (2021),
https://appropriations.house.gov/events/hearings/modernizing-the-federal-civilianapproach-to-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/EPG8-64U4].
60. Final Recommendations of the National Security Commission on Artificial
Intelligence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cyber, Innovative Techs., and Info.
Sys. and H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform’s Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., 117th Cong.
(2021), https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings?ID=32A667CD-578C-4F65-9F4
F-1E26EE8F389A [https://perma.cc/MB8W-JTN6].
61. Leading the Wireless Future: Securing American Network Technology:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Comm’ns and Tech. of the Comm. on Energy and
Com., 117th Cong. (2021), https://energycommerce.house.gov/committee-activity/
hearings/rescheduled-hearing-on-leading-the-wireless-future-securing-american
[https://perma.cc/JXV7-RXPQ].
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Workforce of the Defense Department and the Military Services.”62 On
April 30, 2021, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Cyber,
Innovative Technologies and Information Systems held a hearing on
“Technology and Information Warfare: The Competition for Influence and
the Department of Defense.”63 On May 3, 2021, the House Homeland
Security Committee, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection and Innovation held a hearing on “Responding to Ransomware:
Exploring Policy Solutions to a Cybersecurity Crisis.”64
The number of committees and subcommittee hearings in this short
period, and the variety of cyber-related topics addressed in the hearings,
illustrate the “patchwork mismatch” currently plaguing congressional
oversight efforts. This fractured congressional committee structure,
demonstrated above, exacerbates the problems stemming from the
executive branch’s dispersion of cybersecurity responsibilities. Both
problems then contribute to the third challenge created by the U.S.
government’s disorganized cyber architecture: inadequate collaboration
with the private sector.
C. Inadequate Collaboration with the Private Sector
No summary of the U.S. government’s cyber disorganization
problem would be complete without noting the lack of effective
collaboration with the private sector. Authors Richard Clarke & Robert
Knake note the “collective groan from those in the industry” that meets
calls for public-private partnerships and shared responsibility for
cybersecurity.65 Complaints abound from all directions, and this may be one
of the knottiest challenges facing the U.S. government as it considers
reforms to the cybersecurity organizational chart. While it is beyond the
scope of this to provide a full accounting of the private sector collaboration
62. Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Current and Future Cyber
Workforce in the Department of Defense and the Military Services: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Pers. of the Comm. on Armed Serv., 117th Cong. (2021), https://
www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-receive-testimony-on-the-current-andfuture-cyber-workforce-of-the-department-of-defense-and-the-military-services
[https://perma.cc/63M3-FW3E].
63. Technology and Information Warfare: The Competition for Influence and
the Department of Defense: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cyber, Innovative
Techs., and Info. Sys., 117th Cong. (2021), https://armedservices.house.
gov/hearings?ID=142102B1-A2F8-44E5-B000-CB328CDFE196 [https://perma.cc/
642M-WCPJ].
64. Responding to Ransomware: Exploring Policy Solutions to a
Cybersecurity Crisis: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure,
& Innovation of the Comm. on Homeland Sec., 117th Cong. (2021),
https://homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/responding-to-ransomware-explor
ing-policy-solutions-to-a-cybersecurity-crisis [https://perma.cc/RSU6-NWH3].
65. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 6, at 89.
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problem, it is helpful to group the challenges into three categories:
hesitancy to seek federal assistance; confusion on which federal agencies to
contact; and distrust over sharing cyber threat and vulnerability
information.
The first challenge involves hesitancy about alerting the federal
government when a company encounters a cyber incident. This hesitancy
stems in part from concerns about the government overstaying its welcome
and investigating matters unrelated to the cyber incident, potentially
exposing the company to antitrust and FTC enforcement actions.66 During
the Obama administration, the government initiated several efforts to
alleviate these concerns by providing assurances and codifying liability
protections for sharing certain types of cyber-related information.67 Despite
these efforts, few companies participate in the mechanisms provided and
the hesitancy to alert the government remains.68
A second challenge is that many companies remain confused as to
which federal government agency to contact–the FBI, CISA, US-CERT?
This confusion stems from the “who sits at the cyber help desk” problem
noted above. The severity and type of cyber incident may lead a company
66. Id. at 113; Jill Rhodes & Robert S. Litt, THE ABA CYBERSECURITY
HANDBOOK: A RESOURCE FOR ATTORNEYS, LAW FIRMS, AND BUSINESS
PROFESSIONALS 219-42 (2d ed. 2019).
67. See Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–10
(2015); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. AND FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST POLICY
STATEMENT ON SHARING OF CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION (Apr. 10, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/297681/140410ftcd
ojcyberthreatstmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E8P-G4QX]; Exec. Order No. 13691,
Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing, 80 Fed. Reg. 9,349
(Feb. 20, 2015); Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOS),
CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, https://www.cisa.gov/
information-sharing-and-analysis-organizations-isaos (last visited Feb. 23, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/SK9X-TD88]. For a summary of why these efforts are so
difficult, see Robert Knake, Sharing Classified Cyber Threat Information with the
Private Sector, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (May 15, 2018),
https://www.cfr.org/report/sharing-classified-cyber-threat-information-private-sect
or [https://perma.cc/J6NV-9Z73].
68. Joseph Marks, Only 6 Non-Federal Groups Share Cyber Threat Info with
Homeland Security, NEXTGOV (Jun. 27, 2018), https://www.nextgov.com/
cybersecurity/2018/06/only-6-non-federal-groups-share-cyber-threat-info-home
land-security/149343/ [https://perma.cc/8MCK-K7C9]. While CISA has increased
the overall number of AIS program participants by 142 percent since the program’s
inception in 2016, “only 2 of 188 AIS participants (1 percent) shared cyber
indicators with CISA in 2017, and only 9 of 252 participants (3 percent) shared
indicators in 2018.” OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR HOMELAND SEC., DHS
MADE LIMITED PROGRESS TO IMPROVE INFORMATION SHARING UNDER
CYBERSECURITY ACT IN CALENDAR YEARS 2017 AND 2018 8, 12 (2020), https://
www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-74-Sep20.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YPS2-YSPW].
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in different directions, and by design69 will determine the level of
government support. Of course, many large companies with well-financed
IT departments have detailed incident response plans and decision trees that
identify the appropriate federal agency.70 But then, most companies,
regardless of size, simply do not have the resources to do so.71 Thus, the
perception of a disorganized federal responses may be more harmful than
actually warranted. Nonetheless, it persists.
A third problem in this area is that the U.S. government has a
reputation for failing to share the cyber-related information it possesses.
The Vulnerabilities Equities Process and Policy72 is an executive branch
policy that guides the decision-making process when the government
discovers exploitable weaknesses, or vulnerabilities, in information
systems. This interagency mechanism seeks to balance the private sector’s
(and the public’s) interest in disclosure with the government’s need to keep
such vulnerabilities secret for national security, intelligence, or law
enforcement purposes.73 Since its inception, scholars and companies have
criticized the policy for being biased in favor of defense and intelligence
interests.74 Specifically, the lack of private sector representation on the
69. PPD-41, supra note 31. PPD-41 offers important guidance on which
federal entities have lead responsibility for responding to various types of cyber
incidents. In practice, however, the directive poses almost as many questions as it
resolves.
70. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 6 at 33–61.
71. Kate Polit, Majority of Organizations Lack a Cybersecurity Incident
Response Plan, MERITALK (Apr. 11, 2019, 11:29 AM), https://www.meritalk.com/
articles/majority-of-organizations-lack-a-cybersecurity-incident-response-plan/
[https://perma.cc/2TKP-MBAN].
72. WHITE HOUSE, VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES POLICY AND PROCESS FOR THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (2017), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/images/External%20-%20Unclassified%20VEP%20Charter%
20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/ZZ4N-2BJY].
73. Id.
74. Sharon Bradford Franklin, The Need for Countries to Establish Robust
and Transparent Vulnerabilities Equities Processes, 6 FLETCHER SEC. REV. 45
(2019); SVEN HERPIG, GOVERNMENTAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT: WEIGHING TEMPORARY RETENTION VERSUS IMMEDIATE
DISCLOSURE OF 0-DAY VULNERABILITIES (2018), https://www.stiftung-nv.de/
sites/default/files/vulnerability_management.pdf [https://perma.cc/BSE5-HFEN];
Ari Schwartz & Rob Knake, Discussion Paper 2016-04, Government’s Role in
Vulnerability Disclosure: Creating a Permanent and Accountable Vulnerability
Equities Process, 2016 HARV. KENNEDY BELFER CTR. 8, https://
www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Vulnerability%20Disclo
sure%20Web-Final4.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA6H-Y9LE]; Brad Smith, The Need
for Urgent Collective Action to Keep People Safe Online: Lessons from Last
Week’s Cyberattack, MICROSOFT (May 14, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.
com/on-the-issues/2017/05/14/need-urgent-collective-action-keep-people-safeonline-lessons-last-weeks-cyberattack/ [https://perma.cc/Z9SM-EK87].
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decision-making body has fomented distrust within the private sector. For
example, the National Security Agency’s (NSA) decision to retain
knowledge of the Eternal Blue vulnerability in Microsoft operating systems
for five years after discovering it (and using it for intelligence exploits)
badly damaged its relationship with private sector entities.75 Despite the
NSA’s recent efforts76 to rebuild that trust, the residue from that failure to
share has cast a long shadow. Even when the government would like to
share cyber information, a number of challenges relating to classified
information and the protection of sources and methods, inhibits the ability
to quickly disseminate the information to partners in the private sector.77
The SolarWinds hack provides a compelling reminder that
government and private sector networks are intimately connected and
interdependent, and that effective coordination and timely information
sharing are critical to the cybersecurity task.78 While this observation seems
obvious, attempts to remedy this problem have been met with little success.
The much-heralded CSC Final Report highlighted the need to
“operationalize cybersecurity collaboration with the private sector” as one
of six pillars supporting a strategy of layered deterrence.79 The report urged
the U.S. government and industry to develop “a new social contract of
75. Ellen Nakashima & Craig Timberg, NSA Officials Worried About the Day
Its Potent Hacking Tool Would Get Loose. Then it Did, WASH. POST (May 16,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/nsa-officials-worried
-about-the-day-its-potent-hacking-tool-would-get-loose-then-it-did/2017/05/16/506
70b16-3978-11e7-a058-ddbb23c75d82_story.html [https://perma.cc/N92N-X528];
see also Lily Hay Newman, The Leaked NSA Spy Tool that Hacked the World,
WIRED (Mar. 7, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/eternalblue-leakednsa-spy-tool-hacked-world/ [https://perma.cc/2XEN-AW7B]. For a detailed history
of this episode, see NICOLE PERLROTH, THIS IS HOW THEY TELL ME THE WORLD
ENDS: THE CYBER WEAPONS ARMS RACE (2020), 308-09, 340-41, 347–49; BEN
BUCHANAN, THE HACKER AND THE STATE: CYBER ATTACKS AND THE NEW
NORMAL OF GEOPOLITICS (2020), 253–54.
76. Ellen Nakashima, The Cybersecurity 202: Here’s Why NSA Rushed to
Expose a Dangerous Computer Bug, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2
020/02/06/the-cybersecurity-202-here-s-why-nsa-rushed-to-expose-a-dangerouscomputer-bug/5e3b0f41602ff15f8279a52e/ [https://perma.cc/H2DL-BHGV].
77. Robert K. Knake, Sharing Classified Cyber Threat Information With the
Private Sector, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (May 15, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/
report/sharing-classified-cyber-threat-information-private-sector [https://perma.cc/
74M9-ZWR5].
78. See SolarWinds Cyberattack Demands Significant Federal and PrivateSector Response (Infographic), U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.: GAO@100
BLOG (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.gao.gov/blog/solarwinds-cyberattack-demandssignificant-federal-and-private-sector-response-infographic
[https://perma.cc/Z7KD-376K].
79. CSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
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shared responsibility to secure the nation in cyberspace.”80 The new
arrangement must include better information sharing mechanisms to
achieve “truly shared situational awareness” of cyber threats.81
As of February 2021, nine U.S. government entities have been
identified as victims of the SolarWinds hack, as well as over 100 private
companies.82 The U.S. government’s detection systems, including many
that were heralded, failed to detect, identify, or halt the breach.83 Rather, a
private sector company, FireEye, alerted the U.S. government to the
breach.84 At least one private company identified the breach several months
before FireEye, but decided not to share that cyber threat intelligence with
other companies or the federal government.85 The lack of coordination
impacted the U.S. government’s response to the incident as well, as each

80. Id. at 96.
81. Id.
82. White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki
and Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology Anne
Neuberger (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/pressbriefings/2021/02/17/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-deputynational-security-advisor-for-cyber-and-emerging-technology-anne-neubergerfebruary-17-2021/ [https://perma.cc/WL6R-86R6].
83. Justin Katz, Does Einstein Need a Post-SolarWinds Makeover, FCW (Feb.
1, 2021), https://fcw.com/articles/2021/02/01/einstein-rethink-supply-chain-hack.
aspx [https://perma.cc/HA49-SWZT]; Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, The U.S.
Government Spent Billions on a System for Detecting Hacks. The Russians
Outsmarted It, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2020, 9:48 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/national-security/ruusian-hackers-outsmarted-us-defenses/202
0/12/15/3deed840-3f11-11eb-9453-fc36ba051781_story.html [https://perma.cc/S76
6-4TNY]. As of the writing of this article, debates continue as to the scope of the
hack and whether it was more akin to espionage or a use of force. See, e.g., Dmitri
Alperovitch, Erica Borghard, Jason Healey & Ryan Evans, Great Power Cyber
Party, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Apr. 19, 2021), https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/
great-power-cyber-party/ [https://perma.cc/BL49-FX7W]. Debates also continue on
whether the EINSTEIN detection system was intended to or designed to detect this
type of activity. See Katz, supra.
84. Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to
Compromise Multiple Global Victims with SUNBURST Backdoor, FIREEYE:
THREAT RESEARCH BLOG (Dec. 13, 2020), https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threatresearch/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compro
mises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html [https://perma.cc/X87G-F9WN].
85. Nikesh Arora, Palo Alto Networks Rapid Response: Navigating the
SolarStorm Attack, PALO ALTO NETWORKS, (Dec. 17, 2020, 6:03 PM),
https://blog.paloaltonetworks.com/2020/12/solarwinds-statement-solarstorm/
[https://perma.cc/YNL3_2XGT]; Robert K. Knake, Most Tools Failed to Detect the
SolarWinds Malware. Those That Did Failed Too, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.
(Jan. 28, 2021, 11:07 AM), https://www.cfr.org/blog/most-tools-failed-detect-solar
winds-malware-those-did-failed-too [https://perma.cc/A9N2-Y9EC].
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agency sought to conduct its own post-event review.86 In addition,
congressional committees are battling for the spotlight as each committee
seeks to demonstrate its commitment to cybersecurity, and to holding
executive branch officials to account for the SolarWinds episode.87 In sum,
SolarWinds is only the most recent of many incidents that have exposed the
government’s cybersecurity organization problem. It may however prove to
be the episode that incentivizes meaningful reform.
II. CONVENTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S
CYBERSECURITY ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM
The section above examined the most vexing aspects of the
government’s disorganized cyber architecture. Taking account of those
aspects, this section profiles the solutions currently being proffered to
reorganize the U.S. government’s approach to its cyber-related
responsibilities. Calls for reform of the U.S. government’s cybersecurity
86. A letter to administration officials dated February 9, 2021 from Senators
Mark Warner and Marco Rubio, Chair and Vice Chair of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, criticized the executive branch for a “disjointed and disorganized
response” to the SolarWinds breach. Letter from Mark Warner, Chairman of the S.
Select Comm. on Intel., and Marco Rubio, Vice Chairman of the S. Select Comm.
on Intel., to Avril Haines, Dir. of Nat’l Intel., Paul Nakasone, Dir. of Nat’l Sec.
Agency, Christopher Wray, Dir. of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation, and Brandon
Wales, Acting Dir. of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Sec. Agency (Feb. 9,
2021), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/f/2/f26e92ba-2b05-4e65bbda-10d3a8dc1c81/0CE82FCBF5172B642C7B6F9C2440B778.hainesnakasonew
raywales-ssci-09feb21.pdf [https://perma.cc/L84N-BGLS]. In response, the White
House insisted that Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging
Technology Anne Neuberger was leading response efforts. Julian E. Barnes &
David E. Sanger, White House Announces Senior Official Is Leading Inquiry Into
SolarWinds Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
02/10/us/politics/biden-russia-solarwinds-hacking.html [https://perma.cc/Q58C-SV
FA].
87. Maggie Miller, Hearings Examine Consequences of Massive SolarWinds
Breach, THE HILL (Feb. 23, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/cyber
security/539981-hearings-examine-consequences-of-massive-solarwinds-breach
[https://perma.cc/DX92-UEYV]; Corinne Reichart, SolarWinds Hearing
Announced by House Committees, CNET (Feb. 22, 2021, 12:44 PM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/solarwinds-hearing-announced-by-house-committees/
[https://perma.cc/5G33-MQVJ]; Alyza Sebenius & Kevin Cirilli, SolarWinds Hack
Grabs Senate Spotlight with CEO in the Hot Seat, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2021,
6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-23/key-lawmakerprepares-for-first-public-hearing-on-major-hack
[https://perma.cc/G365-FR96];
U.S. House Committees to Hold Feb. 26 Hearing on ‘SolarWinds’ Hack, REUTERS
(Feb. 22, 2021, 10:54 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-cyber-solarwinds/
us-house-committees-to-hold-feb-26-hearing-on-solarwinds-hack-idUSL1N2KS1Q
C [https://perma.cc/6KF2-P7EH].
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architecture have been numerous and have been around for a quite a
while.88 The most comprehensive of the recent calls for organizational
reform is contained in the March 2020 report of the Cyberspace Solarium
Commission (CSC Final Report).89 The report tackles the cyber
disorganization problem head-on and focuses its foundational pillar on the
need to reform the U.S. government’s structure and organization for
cyberspace.90 Missing from the CSC Final Report and other calls for
reform, however, is recognition of the important contributions that
inspectors general can make–and indeed have already made–in addressing
the government’s cyber disorganization problem. This section will provide
an overview of the most common recommendations and briefly highlight
the intersection points for contributions by inspectors general.
Synthesizing the various calls for organizational reform reveals
recommendations that fall into five categories and that focus on remedying
two types of defects. The first category focuses on calls for the White
House to update the national cyber strategy.91 The most recent strategy92

88. See GAO-20-629, supra note 6; CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 6; David
H. Petraeus & Kiran Sridhar, The Case for a National Cybersecurity Agency,
POLITICO (Sept. 5, 2018, 5:18 AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2018/
09/05/cybersecurity-agency-homeland-security-000686/ [https://perma.cc/CS4E-Y
ZNQ]; Cyberspace Mandate, supra note 38.
89. CSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 2. The CSC was a congressionallycreated commission that was tasked with developing “a consensus on a strategic
approach to defending the United States in cyberspace against cyber attacks of
significant consequences.” John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636, 2141–46 (2018) (codified
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 10 U.S.C., 14 U.S.C., 41 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., and
50 U.S.C.). The Commission’s efforts were contained in a 180-page report issued
in March 2020. The CSC Final Report calls for a cohesive U.S. cyber strategy of
layered cyber deterrence, with the objective of reducing the probability and impact
of cyberattacks of significant consequence. The report is structured along six
pillars, and each pillar includes key recommendations as well as enabling
recommendations.
90. CSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 1–7. The report’s recommendations
provide an important roadmap in this reorganization exercise because they
incorporate the suggestions and observations of earlier critics, while adding
valuable insights from the interagency, interbranch, and private sector perspectives.
91. Handler, supra note 47; U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N,
TRANSITION BOOK FOR THE INCOMING BIDEN ADMINISTRATION: CSC WHITE
PAPER #5 (2021), https://www.solarium.gov/public-communications/transitionbook [https://perma.cc/ZX24-RNQH] [hereinafter CSC WHITE PAPER #5]; Richard
J. Harknett, SolarWinds: The Need for Persistent Engagement, LAWFARE (Dec. 23,
2020 4:41 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/solarwinds-need-persistent-engage
ment [https://perma.cc/867G-ZHQD].
92. Terri Moon Cronk, White House Releases First National Cyber Strategy
in 15 Years, DOD NEWS (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/
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was published in 2018, and the prior strategy was last updated in 2003. The
calls for a revamp of the national cyber strategy focus on ensuring
alignment with a strategy of layered cyber deterrence93, and providing
mechanisms for better engagement with the private sector.94 The CSC Final
Report urged the executive branch to issue a new national cyber strategy
designed to bring “coherence to the federal government’s efforts” and to
better integrate the “various departments and agencies [that] constitute
critical but separate components of an effective national cyber strategy.”95
The second recommendation category, tied closely to the first,
seeks the establishment of a National Cyber Director, and accompanying
office, within the executive branch. The goal of this position is to provide
an executive branch that is “more agile and effective in cyberspace.”96
While some worry the position will only create more bureaucracy97,
Congress endorsed the establishment of a National Cyber Director (NCD)
in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2021.98 Among the
Article/Article/1641969/white-house-releases-first-national-cyber-strategy-in-15years/ [https://perma.cc/5CD6-MM9H].
93. CSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 32; CSC WHITE PAPER #5, supra
note 91, at 4.
94. Handler, supra note 47; CSC WHITE PAPER #5, supra note 91, at 4; Brad
Smith, A Moment of Reckoning: the Need for a Strong and Global Cybersecurity
Response, MICROSOFT (Dec. 17, 2020), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-theissues/2020/12/17/cyberattacks-cybersecurity-solarwinds-fireeye/ [https://perma.cc/
YB9C-4ADK].
95. CSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 31–32.
96. Id. at 37.
97. James N. Miller & Robert Butler, Making the National Cyber Director
Operational With a National Cyber Defense Center, LAWFARE (Mar. 24, 2021,
10:48 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/making-national-cyber-director-opera
tional-national-cyber-defense-center [https://perma.cc/2237-V72N]; Andrew J.
Grotto, How to Make the National Cyber Director Position Work, LAWFARE (Jan.
15, 2021, 2:40 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-make-national-cyberdirector-position-work
[https://perma.cc/2ZE2-794U];
Philip
Reitinger,
Establishing a National Cyber Director Would Be a Mistake, LAWFARE (Jul. 17,
2020, 8:31 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/establishing-national-cyber-director
-would-be-mistake [https://perma.cc/69RS-K3MZ].
98. WILLIAM M. (MAC) THORNBERRY NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021) (codified
in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 24
U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 34 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., 48 U.S.C., 50
U.S.C., and 52 U.S.C.). In 2021, President Biden nominated and the Senate
confirmed Chris Inglis as the first National Cyber Director. In addition, the Senate
confirmed President Biden’s nominations of Anne Neuberger to the post of deputy
national security advisor for cyber and emerging technology on the National
Security Council, and Jen Easterly as the Director of the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency at the Department of Homeland Security. See
Natasha Bertrand, Biden taps intelligence veteran for new White House
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NCD’s duties are serving as the principal advisor to the president on
cybersecurity policy and strategy, leading coordination efforts for national
cyber policy and strategy, reporting annually to Congress, and coordinating
and consulting with private sector leaders on cybersecurity and emerging
technology issues.99 While the establishment of the position represents a
critical step in preparing the architecture needed to adopt a whole of
government approach to cyber threats, questions remain as to the NCD’s
ability to affect meaningful change100 and the position’s relationship with
the National Security Council.101
The third category calls for streamlining the congressional
committee structure. Specifically, the CSC recommends the establishment
of two new cybersecurity-focused committees in Congress “to consolidate
budgetary and legislative jurisdiction over cybersecurity issues, as well as
traditional oversight authority.”102 As noted above, the current
congressional committee structure can be described kindly as disjointed
and, more accurately, as dysfunctional. Nonetheless, reforming entrenched
committee power is a difficult task.103 Substantive reform efforts with the
legislative branch may have to wait for the executive branch to first put its
cyber house in order, and to then build a committee structure that is
responsive to the executive’s organizational scheme.
A fourth category includes recommendations to strengthen the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). CISA serves as
the “[n]ation’s risk advisor, working with partners to defend against today’s
threats and collaborating to build more secure and resilient infrastructure
for the future,” and its mission is “to understand and manage cyber and
cybersecurity role, POLITICO (Jan. 6, 2021, 2:56 PM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2021/01/06/biden-white-house-cybersecurity-neuberger-455508 [https://perm
a.cc/LXQ3-69UT]; Bridget Johnson, Jen Easterly Confirmed as New CISA
Director, HOMELAND SECURITY TODAY (July 12, 2021), https://www.hstoday.us/
people-on-the-move/jen-easterly-confirmed-as-new-cisa-director/ [https://perma.cc/
6NH5-2XZM]. While questions remain about each position’s ability to affect
meaningful change and the relationship between the positions, their formation
prepares the architecture needed to adopt a whole of government approach to cyber
threats. Grotto, supra note 97; Joshua Rovner, A Lower Bar for the Cyber Czar,
WAR ON THE ROCKS (Jan. 26, 2021), https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/a-lowerbar-for-the-cyber-czar/ [https://perma.cc/E73G-H5MZ].
99. See WILLIAM M. (MAC) THORNBERRY NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388
(2021) (codified in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C.,
22 U.S.C., 24 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 34 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., 48
U.S.C., 50 U.S.C., and 52 U.S.C.).
100. Grotto, supra note 97.
101. Rovner, supra note 98.
102. CSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 35.
103. See, e.g., Andrew McCanse Wright, Constitutional Conflict and
Congressional Oversight, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 881 (2014).
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physical risk to our critical infrastructure”104 Recommendations in this
category focus on increasing CISA’s budget and staffing,105 growing
CISA’s role as the go to agency for other federal civilian government
agencies on cybersecurity-related matters,106 growing CISA’s private sector
outreach efforts,107 and providing CISA with certain administrative
subpoena powers.108
A fifth category includes the ever present calls for developing “a
stronger federal cyber workforce.”109 The CSC’s Transition Memo110 offers
the following assessment of the enduring workforce challenge:
At present, the public sector needs to fill more than 37,000
cybersecurity jobs. Given that the sector currently employs
more than 56,000 cybersecurity professionals, this shortfall
means that about one in three public-sector cybersecurity
jobs sits unfilled. Meanwhile firms are confronted with the
challenge of filling almost half a million cybersecurity
jobs. To address unfilled federal cyber jobs in 2009,
experts called for the White House cybersecurity
coordinator to develop a federal cyber workforce strategy.
Twelve years later, the U.S. federal government still does
not have an effective cyber workforce strategy or any clear
leader responsible for developing and implementing such a
strategy.111

104. About CISA, CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY,
https://www.cisa.gov/about-cisa [https://perma.cc/PH97-RD9R] (last visited Aug.
22, 2021).
105. See CSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at vi, 3, 39–40; CSC WHITE PAPER
#5, supra note 91, at 5.
106. See CSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 31–33, 35, 37–41, 45.
107. Id. at v– vi,1– 7, 14, 16– 19, 23– 26, 29– 33, 39– 40, 45, 50– 51; CSC
WHITE PAPER #5, supra note 91, at 1, 3–5.
108. WILLIAM M. (MAC) THORNBERRY NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021, H.R. 6395, 116th Cong. § 1716 (2021) (enacted)
(allowing CISA to issue subpoenas to internet service providers to release
vulnerability information from the networks of critical infrastructure
organizations).
109. CSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 43.
110. CSC WHITE PAPER #5, supra note 91, at 7.
111. Id. (citing “Cybersecurity Supply/Demand Heat Map,” CYBERSEEK,
https://www.cyberseek.org/heatmap.html [https://perma.cc/8C9V-5BE9] (last
visited Oct. 5, 2021)); Partnership for Public Service & Booz Allen Hamilton,
Cyber In-Security: Strengthening the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce (2009)
https://ourpublicservice.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Cyber_In-Security__
Strengthening_the_Federal_Cybersecurity_Workforce-2009.07.22.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/WEP3-GV8Q]. In comparison, CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 6, at 144–153,
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The solutions proffered to address the federal government’s cyber
workforce shortage are plentiful and include expanding CyberCorps
Scholarship for Service Program,112 establishing a centralized workforce
leadership and coordination structure for the federal cyber workforce,113
and ensuring the availability of special hiring authorities and pay
flexibilities for cyber talented employees.114
The five recommendations outlined above reveal efforts to tackle
two types of organizational defects. The first centers on agency waste and
duplication within the executive branch. As the CSC report notes, “[m]any
departments and agencies, with different responsibilities for and interests in
securing cyberspace, compete for resources and power, resulting in
conflicting efforts sometimes carried out at cross-purposes.”115 The second
defect focuses on the lack of accountability or clarity as to who has ultimate
responsibility—in either the executive or legislative branches—for
cybersecurity policy and oversight. In many instances, the lack of clarity is
due to the overly dispersed reporting lines and committee structures
described above. Both concerns fall squarely into the type of work that
inspectors general perform: identification of waste and duplication, and
evaluation of organizational and programmatic effectiveness.
The reform recommendations described above are well-intended
efforts toward a better organizational framework for the U.S. government’s
cybersecurity. These recommendations, however, neglect the role that
inspectors general play in supporting new governance structures and
illuminating the structural defects that remain. Reform efforts will be
significantly enhanced by the work of inspectors general across the
executive branch, and particularly by the work of inspectors general in the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and the
Inspector General for the Intelligence Community. A few examples of
recent inspector general activities illustrate their unique ability to flag
points of duplication, waste, and inefficiency in the government’s
cybersecurity efforts.116 For example, the annual reports required by the
167–178, suggest that the cyber workforce talent problem is not as dire as
portrayed, and offer two programs designed to create a better pipeline.
112. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 6, at 172 (suggesting a professional cadre
of federal cybersecurity officers); CSC WHITE PAPER #5, supra note 91, at 8
(prioritizing program in budgetary requests to Congress “in order to (1) increase the
number of colleges and universities that participate in the program and (2) increase
the number of scholarships awarded at participating institutions.”).
113. CSC WHITE PAPER #5, supra note 91, at 6–7.
114. Id. at 8.
115. CSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 37.
116. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DHS NEEDS TO IMPROVE CYBERSECURITY
WORKFORCE PLANNING, 12–13 (2019), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/reports/2019/dhsneeds-improve-cybersecurity-workforce-planning/oig-19-62-sep19 [https://perma.c
c/UE7B-U5XE] [hereinafter DHS OIG REPORT]; TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING TO
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Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA),117 prepared by
inspectors general in every agency, provide critical insight into how the
U.S. government is meeting its cybersecurity requirements, including red
flagging those agencies with persistently weak cybersecurity. Similarly, the
Department of Homeland Security’s inspector general reports evaluating
the effectiveness of CISA’s efforts to effectively disseminate information
within the federal government and to effectively partner with the private
sector, provide critical insights that can shape revisions to CISA’s programs
and budget.118 Finally, there are numerous reports evaluating how federal
agencies are meeting the cyber workforce challenge.119 Drawing insights
and lessons learned from these reports will prevent the recreation of the
wheel problem that continually stymies workforce development efforts. The
next section explores these examples in greater depth, and considers the
attributes that make inspectors general uniquely well-positioned to support
the U.S. government’s cybersecurity reorganization effort.
III. LOOKING PAST THE CONVENTIONAL SOLUTIONS: UNDERSTANDING
AND EMBRACING THE WORK OF INSPECTORS GENERAL
The work of inspectors general will be critical to the cybersecurity
reorganization mission, and particularly the task of developing a
coordinated and cohesive cyber strategy that avoids duplication and waste.
Inspectors general are well positioned to support a whole-of-government
approach due to the following attributes: their legislative mandate allows
them to serve as independent advisors; they occupy a special perch within
their agencies and wield tools designed for the task of assessing waste and
duplication; their role as policy evaluators is growing; Congress is
increasingly reliant on inspectors general for information and evaluation;
RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE CURRENT AND FUTURE CYBER WORKFORCE IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE MILITARY SERVICES BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL 26 (2021).
117. See Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L.
No. 113-283, 128 Stat. 3073 (requiring each agency inspector general or
independent external auditor to conduct an annual independent evaluation to
determine effectiveness of information security programs and practices of its
respective agency); see also Fiscal Year 2021 Inspector General Federal
Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) Reporting Metrics
Version 1.1 (2021).
118. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR
2021, 3–4, 7, 49–54; DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY BUDGET-IN-BRIEF
FISCAL YEAR 2022, at 3–4, 7-8, 55–60, 80.
119. DHS OIG REPORT, supra note 116, at 5, 7, 10–11; TRANSCRIPT OF
HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE CURRENT AND FUTURE CYBER
WORKFORCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE MILITARY SERVICES
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL, supra note 116, at 4, 11–12, 14, 24–
26.
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and inspectors general have established an interagency mechanism for
exchange between inspector general offices that could provide a framework
for cybersecurity-related issues. This section examines each attribute in
turn.
A. Independent Advisors by Design
There are currently seventy-five inspectors general in the U.S.
government120 and more than 13,000 employees working in inspector
general offices across the federal government.121 Their task is to “serve as
the principal watchdogs of the nation’s major federal agencies.”122 While
the concept of independent auditors within executive branch agencies has
existed since the founding of the country,123 the position was formalized
and expanded in the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IGA), which created
and currently governs the offices of statutory inspectors general.124 The
IGA fit into a group of legislative efforts, which Paul Light framed as a

120. COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, TOP
MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES FACING MULTIPLE FEDERAL
AGENCIES 1 (2021), https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/untracked/TMPC_
report_02022021.pdf [https://perma.cc/95BN-WWG9]; see also Inspector General
Vacancy Tracker, POGO (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.pogo.org/database/inspector
-general-vacancy-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/DN4V-RLMD] (identifying 16
vacancies in federal inspector general offices as of June 25, 2021, meaning the top
position in office is either vacant or filled by an acting inspector general).
121. CHARLES A. JOHNSON & KATHRYN E. NEWCOMER, U.S. INSPECTORS
GENERAL: TRUTH TELLERS IN TURBULENT TIMES, 2 (2020) (“The number of
officials working in OIGs has increased to over 13,000 federal employees, with a
combined budget of $2.7 billion in 2016.”).
122. H.R. REP. NO. 110-354, at 8 (2007).
123. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at 99 (2012) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH] (“Inspectors
General, or IGs, are watchdogs that have been sprinkled around the executive
branch since George Washington named Baron Frederick von Steuden to be
inspector general for the Continental Army.”)
124. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101,
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. (2021). For comprehensive works on the role
of the inspectors general in U.S. government, see JOHNSON & NEWCOMER, supra
note 121; CARMEN R. APAZA, INTEGRITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT:
HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (Tom Payne & Tom Lansford
eds., 2010); INSPECTORS GENERAL: A NEW FORCE IN EVALUATION (MICHAEL
HENDRICKS ET AL. EDS., 1990); PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT:
INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993); MARK H.
MOORE & MARGARET JANE GATES, INSPECTORS-GENERAL: JUNKYARD DOGS OR
MAN'S BEST FRIEND? (1986); Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie Fine Knowles, The
Inspector General Act in the Federal Government: A New Approach to
Accountability, 36 ALA. L. REV. 473, 473–74 (1984).
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“busy season in the search for government accountability.”125 The act came
about in particular response to executive branch abuses126 and can be
grouped with the War Powers Resolution of 1973,127 the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978,128 the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,129 and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.130 These statutes shared
common goals: to ensure robust and accountable executive branch decisionmaking, to strengthen congressional oversight of executive branch agencies,
and to increase Congress’s access to information in the hands of executive
branch agencies.131
To accomplish these goals, the defining feature of the inspector
general position is independence. The core responsibilities outlined in
Section 2 of the Act reflect this feature:
(1) to conduct and supervise audits and investigations
relating to the programs and operations of the
establishments listed in section 12(2);
(2) to provide leadership and coordination and recommend
policies for activities designed (A) to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and
(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, such programs
and operations; and
(3) to provide a means for keeping the head of the
establishment and the Congress fully and currently
informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the

125. LIGHT, supra note 124, at 11.
126. See S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 4 (1978) (listing examples of “epidemic”
levels of fraud, abuse and waste motivating enactment of the IGA).
127. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
128. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824.
129. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111.
130. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436.
131. See supra notes 124, 127, 128, 129, 130 (identifying purposes for
enactment); KATHRYN FRANCIS, CONGRESSIONAL RSCH. SERV., STATUTORY
INSPECTORS GENERAL IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A PRIMER 2-3 (Jan 3, 2019),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45450.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9YVV-CCZJ]
[hereinafter FRANCIS, A PRIMER] (describing history and tenets of Inspector
General Act of 1978). For a broader overview of the history of federal inspectors
general, see KATHRYN FRANCIS & MICHAEL GREENE, CONGRESSIONAL RSCH.
SERV., FEDERAL INSPECTORS GENERAL: HISTORY, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RECENT
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, (Jul. 20, 2016), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20
160720_R43814_c8b393d645313cc24a2b7a1bb8c1cb4abe072ccd.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/TC3E-ULN3] [hereinafter FRANCIS & GREENE].
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administration of such programs and operations and the
necessity for and progress of corrective action . . . .”132
The independence feature also is prominent in the provisions
governing the appointment and eligibility requirements for inspectors
general. Section 3 states that inspectors general shall be appointed “without
regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and
demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law
management analysis, public administration, or investigations.”133 While
inspectors general may be appointed in several ways, the usual route,
dictated by § 3 of the IGA, is appointment by the President and
confirmation by the Senate.134 This method applies to inspectors general in
the cabinet-level departments and larger agencies.135
The importance of protecting the independence of inspectors
general is also reflected in the provisions governing removal, although
Congress had to address the knotty separation of powers issues involving
constraints on the President’s removal power. The removal process for
statutory inspectors general is generally uniform.136 The President may
remove an inspector general from office, so long as the president
communicates in writing the reasons for removal or transfer to both Houses
of Congress at least thirty days before the removal or transfer.137 The courts
have adopted a broad interpretation of this power, consistent with the
President’s removal powers of other executive officers, and the legislative
history of the IGA indicates the President may “remove any Inspector
General at any time.”138 The independence vein is reflected here not by
limiting the President’s removal power, but by requiring notice to Congress
of the removal and the reasons for it.139
132. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2; see also MOORE & GATES, supra note 124, at 15.
133. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3(a). Candidates for the CIA inspector general and the
Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) must also have prior experience
in the field of foreign intelligence or national security and be in compliance with
the relevant security standards (50 U.S.C. §3517(b) and §3033(c), respectively, for
the CIA inspector general and the IC IG). FRANCIS & GREENE, supra note 131, at 7.
134. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3(a) (“There shall be at the head of each Office an
Inspector General who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, without regard to political affiliation and solely on the
basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial
analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.”)
135. See FRANCIS & GREENE, supra note 131, at 3–5, 7–8 (describing
different methods of appointing federal inspectors general).
136. See FRANCIS, A PRIMER, supra note 131, at 12–13 (describing common
removal methods, and noting special removal procedures for inspectors general in
Designated Federal Entities (DFEs), U.S. Postal Service, and U.S. Capitol Police).
137. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3(b).
138. H.R. REP. NO. 95-584, at 2, 9, 12 (1997).
139. See generally LIGHT, supra note 124.
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More recent expressions of support for the preservation of the
inspectors general's independence can be found in a variety of legislative
proposals currently circulating in Congress which call for reforming the
President’s ability to remove inspectors general.140 Many of these
proposals, of course, were in response to former President Trump’s spate of
inspector general firings, most notably from intelligence and national
security agencies.141 Independence is also reflected in the day-to-day
operational aspects of the position, including the selection process for work
assignments,142 the agency reporting structures,143 and the budgetary
mechanisms and process for inspector general funding.144
Despite the vast powers noted above, there are two important limits
on the inspectors general’s authority. First, the role is advisory only.145 The
inspector general may identify problems and recommend changes, however,
the inspector general has no authority to take corrective action or to
implement the policy changes it recommends.146 Indeed, this advisor role
may actually be an advantage.147 Without concern for implementation of
remedies, the inspectors general do not pull their punches.148 In other
words, they do not pre-frame the problem in a way that allows for or leans
heavily toward a desired solution.149 The advisory status provides for
140. See Inspectors General Independence Act, S. 3664, 116th Cong. (2020);
Inspectors General Independence Act, H.R. 6668, 116th Cong. (2020); Seeking
Inspector General’s Honest Testimony Act (SIGHT Act), S. 3766, 116th Cong.
(2020); Securing Inspector General Independence Act of 2020, S. 3994, 116th
Cong. (2020); Inspector General Access Act of 2019, S. 685, 116th Cong. (2019);
Inspector General Access Act of 2019, H.R. 202, 116th Cong. (2019); Inspector
General Protection Act, H.R. 1847, 116th Cong. (2019).
141. See The Lawfare Podcast: Firing Inspectors General, LAWFARE (May
19, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-firing-inspectors-general
[https://perma.cc/93BC-YBSH].
142. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4. Work assignments come from several sources,
including congressional request, agency request, or at the initiation of the inspector
general.
143. Id. § 3(a), (d). In most instances, inspectors general report directly to the
agency head (or high-level member of the secretary’s executive team). In addition,
inspectors general report to the relevant congressional committees. While this dual
reporting structure is not without its challenges, it has proven a workable
arrangement. See infra Section III.D.
144. Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–13, § 8
(2008); H.R. REP. NO. 110-354, at 11 (2007).
145. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 2–4.
146. Id. § 4.
147. Glenn Fine, Seven Principles of Highly Effective Inspectors General,
CTR. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PUB. INTEGRITY 2 (2017), http://inspectors
general.org/files/2017/06/Seven-Principles-of-Highly-Effective-InspectorsGeneral.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA7F-CRUK].
148. Id. at 3.
149. Id. at 3–4.
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greater candor. The Senate report accompanying the 1978 IGA
acknowledged the challenge of balancing the inspectors general’s need for
independence with the agency’s management needs, concluding:
If the Agency Head is committed to running and managing
the agency effectively and to rooting out fraud, abuse, and
waste at all levels, the Inspector and Auditor General can
be his strong right arm in doing so, while maintaining the
independence needed to honor his reporting obligations to
Congress. The Committee does not doubt that some tension
can result from this relationship, but the Committee
believes that the potential advantages far outweigh the
potential risks.”150
Second, and not surprisingly, this independence is somewhat
constrained for inspectors general in national security agencies.151 The
statute includes additional provisions governing the inspectors general for
the departments of defense, homeland security, and justice. The agency
heads in these entities may block inspector general investigations or reports
if they relate to certain sensitive topics or national security matters.152 As
such, these provisions carve away a large swath of inspector general
independence if the matter involves sensitive operational plans, intelligence
matters, counterintelligence matters, ongoing criminal investigations by
other administrative units, or other matters the disclosure of which would
constitute a serious threat to national security.153 In such situations, the
inspector general “shall be under the authority, direction, and control” of
the agency head, thus creating a sweeping exception to independence
provisions in Section 3(a) of the IGA.154 If the agency head determines such
action is necessary to “preserve the national security interests of the United
States,”155 they may prohibit the inspector general from “initiating, carrying
out, or completing any audit or investigation, from accessing information
[relating to matters described above], or from issuing any subpoena.”156 The
statutes and regulations governing the inspector general for the CIA, as well
as inspectors general for several other intelligence community entities,
include similar clauses allowing for national security exceptions to the

150. S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 10–11 (Westlaw) (1978).
151. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 3(d), 5(e)(1)(B), 6(e)(7), 8(b).
152. Id. §§ 5(e)(B), 8(b)(1)(D), (b)(2), 8D(a)(1)(F), 8E(a)(1)(E), 8G(d)(2)(A),
8I(a)(1)(F).
153. Id. §§ 8(b)(1) (DoD), 8E(a)(1)-(2) (DOJ), 8I(2) (DHS).
154. Id. §§ 8(b)(1) (DoD), 8E(a)(1) (DOJ), 8I(a)(1) (DHS).
155. Id. §§ 8(b)(2) (DoD), 8E(a)(2) (DOJ), 8I(a)(2) (DHS).
156. Id.
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usual inspector general independence.157 Importantly, if an agency head
invokes this prohibition, they must report the fact of the invocation to the
relevant congressional committees.158
Despite these limits on the independence of inspectors general,
there is no doubt the position was intended to be one of significant authority
and structural clout. Scholars Margaret Gates and Marjorie Fine Knowles
offer this observation: “The inspector general is the only executive branch
Presidential appointee who speaks directly to Congress without clearance
from the Office of Management and Budget. . . . This ability to speak
directly to Congress provides a potential source of substantial clout for an
active inspector general.”159 The independence and clout described above
gain greater reach when paired with the position’s unique and statutorilymandated agency perch and accompanying tool kit.
B. Special Perch and Effective Tools
Inspectors general are often viewed as “junkyard dogs”160 by
colleagues in their agencies for their exasperating, and at times, maddening
pursuit of any procedural or substantive flaw, evoking the bothersome
junkyard dog that follows you everywhere and continually digs for
bones.161 Of course, this dogged (forgive the pun) focus is intentional. The
inspectors general were created to provide a critical internal oversight
function by identifying wasteful, wrongful, and illegal activities in their
agencies.162 To accomplish this task, Congress created a special perch for
the inspector general to occupy within the agency.163 This perch allows the
inspector general to get “deep inside the presidency,”164 and provides
unparalleled access and a wholistic perspective. The inspector general is
able to access information relating to relevant legal interpretations,
compliance with internal policies, as well as compliance with external

157. Id. §§ 8G(a)(1)(D), 8G(f)(3)(A); see also generally Shirin Sinnar,
Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security
Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (2013).
158. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 8(b)(3)-(4) (Department of Defense), 8E(a)(3)
(Department of Justice), 8I(3) (Department of Homeland Security).
159. Gates & Knowles, supra note 124, at 475.
160. MOORE & GATES, supra note 124 (title of the authors’ work embraces the
junkyard dog metaphor).
161. GOLDSMITH, supra note 123, at 108; MOORE & GATES, supra note 124.
162. MOORE & GATES, supra note 124, at 3.
163. GOLDSMITH, supra note 123, at 107.
164. Id. at 105. But see Andrew McCanse Wright, Executive Privilege and
Inspectors General, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1295, for (exploring how ability of inspectors
general to access agency materials can put agency executive privilege claims at
risk, thus impacting effectiveness of inspectors general).
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reporting requirements.165 This special perch also allows the inspector
general to acquire a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the
matter being studied.166 Jack Goldsmith describes the advantages of this
delegation: “Congress in effect delegates its initial oversight function to the
inspector general, who can quickly gather a much more complete
understanding of executive branch activity than Congress itself could
have.”167 By giving inspectors general a “perch” inside executive agencies,
Congress is able to surmount the usual separation of powers objections
offered to block congressional or public inquiries (e.g., classified
information, executive privilege, attorney privilege, state secrets, political
question doctrine).168 To put it bluntly, Congress is not able to achieve a
comparable level of access or understanding through its usual oversight
mechanisms.
In addition to the special perch, Congress provided inspectors
general with an arsenal of information gathering tools. As noted in Section
2 of the IGA, the inspector general is charged with keeping the head of the
establishment or agency “fully and currently informed about problems and
deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations
and the necessity for and progress of corrective action.”169 To accomplish
this objective, as well as the congressional notice task, inspectors general
engage in three principal activities: investigations, audits, and inspections
or evaluations.170 Investigations generally involve criminal or civil
misconduct by a government employee, contractor, or grant recipient.171
Audits include both performance and financial audits.172 Financial audits
tend to be the most familiar of the inspector general review types (at least to
outsiders), and involve the assessments of the appropriate allocation and
use of federal money.173 Performance audits provide programmatic analysis
of an entire program or operation; they focus on compliance, efficiency and
effectiveness, internal control, and prospective analysis, and they follow the
Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (or Yellow Book).174
Inspections or evaluations are also programmatic in nature; they examine
the policies, operations, regulations, or legislative implications of a specific
165. See JOHNSON & NEWCOMER, supra note 121, at 39–47 (describing
authorities and evolution of responsibilities); Sinnar, supra note 157, at 1034–39,
1057–58.
166. GOLDSMITH, supra note 123, at 105.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2(3).
170. For a comparison of the differences between the three common types of
inspector general reviews, see FRANCIS, A PRIMER, supra note 131, at 7–9.
171. APAZA, supra note 124, at 13.
172. Id. at 13–14.
173. Id. at 13.
174. See generally FRANCIS, A PRIMER, supra note 131, at 7.
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aspect of a program or operation, or review of a specific agency facility.175
This third activity–inspections and evaluations–is often missed by those
outside the inspector general community and contributes to the common but
incomplete view of inspectors general as bean counters.
To pursue these three activities, the IGA and its subsequent
amendments176 provide inspectors general with broad investigatory powers.
These include authority to: conduct and supervise audits, investigations,
inspections, and reviews into the actions of agencies without interference
by agency heads;177 issue reports with recommendations for corrective
action;178 receive full access to all information (i.e. records and materials)
available to the agency;179 request materials from other executive branch
agencies;180 issue administrative subpoenas to nonfederal entities;181
administer or take an oath, affidavit, or affirmation from any person;182
exercise the authority of law enforcement;183 receive employee and external
complaints;184 appoint officers as necessary to carry out such powers;185
refer matters (both criminal and civil) to the United States Attorney
General;186 hire employees, experts, and consultants and procure necessary
equipment and services; obtain assistance from other agencies (federal,
state and local);187 and enter into contracts and other arrangements with
public and private entities.188
The work product that comes from the use of these tools is
voluminous, even if not widely read. Inspectors general produce statutorily
mandated semi-annual reports189 and incident-specific reports190 to

175. APAZA, supra note 124, at 13.
176. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101;
Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-504, 102 Stat. 2531;
Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, 122 Stat. 4302;
Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-317, 130 Stat. 1595.
For a summary of the various legislative enactments, see FRANCIS, A PRIMER, supra
note 131, at 2-3.
177. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4(a)(1).
178. Id. § 4(a)(5).
179. Id. § 6(a)(1)(A).
180. Id. § 6(a)(3).
181. Id. § 6(a)(4) (providing the power to subpoena documents but not
testimony).
182. Id. § 6(a)(5).
183. Id. § 6(a)(4), (e).
184. Id. § 7.
185. Id. § 6(a)(7).
186. Id. § 4(d).
187. See generally id.
188. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(a)(9).
189. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
SEMIANNUAL REP. TO THE CONG.: APR. 1, 2020–SEPT. 30, 2020 (2020),
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Congress, as well as reports on the implementation status191 of prior
recommendations. In addition, inspectors general provide a joint biennial
report as required by the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015192,
and annual reports as required by the Federal Information Security
Modernization Act of 2014.193 In addition, both Congress and the agency
head can ask the inspector general to conduct specific investigations, audits,
or inspections.194 The special perch and accompanying tool kit statutorily
allocated to inspectors general provide a unique capacity to identify
cybersecurity organizational successes and failures, and to disseminate such
information to those in policy-making positions.
C. Growing Role as Policy Evaluator and Valued Advisor to Agency
Head
The third reason inspectors general are well-positioned to support
the U.S. Government’s efforts to a build a more cohesive structure for
cybersecurity matters is due to the growing role of evaluative work in the
inspector general portfolio. Inspectors general are moving–indeed have
moved–well beyond the tasks of identifying fraud, waste, and abuse, and
instead are more often engaged in reviewing emerging policy areas.195
Indeed the 1978 IGA anticipated such a role and the report accompanying
the act looked favorably upon the inspector general involvement in
“reviewing of existing legislation and proposed regulations in order to offer
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/SAR/2020/oig-sar-apr20-sep20.
pdf [https://perma.cc/57F9-ADZ5].
190. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW
OF FOUR FISA APPLICATIONS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE FBI’S CROSSFIRE
HURRICANE INVESTIGATION (2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-exami
nation.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2HR-7CGJ] [https://perma.cc/BGW2-8CV6].
191. Id. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, OIG’S TOP UNIMPLEMENTED RECOMMENDATIONS: SOLUTIONS TO
REDUCE FRAUD, WASTE AND ABUSE IN HHS PROGRAMS (2021),
https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/compendium/files/compendium2021.p
df [https://perma.cc/WZV7-97DE]
192. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY,
JOINT REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION
SHARING ACT OF 2015 (2017), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/AUD-2017005.pdf [https://perma.cc/26TH-ZWGU] [hereinafter Joint Report on CISA].
193. Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-283, 128 Stat. 3073, 3081-82; The most recent FISMA report for DHS is OFF.
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-20-77, EVALUATION
OF DHS’ INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019
(REDACTED) (2019), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-10/
OIG-20-77-Sep20.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC2F-Z9VW] [hereinafter OIG-20-77].
194. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2, 4.
195. Sinnar, supra note 157, at 1079.
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guidance concerning their likely impact on fraud and abuse control as well
as economy and efficiency.”196 The conference report notes that the
“committee believes that this is a particularly vital role for the inspector and
auditor general to play. The inspector and auditor general should not simply
investigate fraud and waste after they have occurred. Rather, this
preventative and deterrent function . . . should be crucial.”197 The evaluative
nature of inspector general work is best reflected in inspections that
“examine the extent to which individual federal programs or installations
are complying with applicable laws, regulations, and policies, while other
inspections determine how entire programs might be amended or
redirected.”198
Inspectors general, particularly in national security, law
enforcement, and intelligence entities, may be uniquely positioned to
influence internal executive branch policy in a way that Congress may
not.199 As chronicled in the work of Shirin Sinnar,200 the role of inspectors
general in national security entities has evolved since 9/11 from a focus on
mismanagement, waste, and audits to one of inspections of privacy and
civil rights abuses, and evaluation of internal policies and guidelines.201
This growing role as policy evaluator and valued advisor to agency head is
the result of the comprehensive and independent nature of the inspector
general reports, the public release of the inspector general reports (even if
in redacted form), and the subsequent media coverage.202 Examples of
inspectors general influencing internal rules and policies include: changes
made to the FBI’s FISA warrant application process after publication of a
Department of Justice Inspector General’s report on the Carter
Page/Crossfire Hurricane investigation;203 changes made to the CIA’s
196. S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 8 (1978).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Sinnar, supra note 157, at 1034.
200. Id.
201. This evolution, according to Sinnar, led to inspectors general in national
security and intelligence agencies exercising a critical individual rights oversight
function. This individual rights oversight function has five dimensions: (i)
increasing transparency; (ii) identifying rights violations; (iii) providing relief for
victims of violations; (iv) holding government officials accountable; and (v)
revising internal rules and policies to prevent future abuses. Id. at 1033.
202. Id. at 1043 (“The reports drew tremendous media attention, including
front-page coverage in major national newspapers, and Congress held several
hearings questioning Justice Department officials on the detentions, with members
of both parties praising the OIG report.”).
203. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF FOUR
FISA APPLICATIONS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE FBI’S CROSSFIRE HURRICANE
INVESTIGATION 428 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.
pdf [https://perma.cc/U2HR-7CGJ]; Natasha Bertrand & Darren Samuelson,
Inspector General’s Report on Russia Probe: Key Takeaways, POLITICO (Dec. 9,
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rendition and interrogation programs after a CIA Inspector General report
identified abuses in the program’s administration, questioned its efficacy,
and doubted the legal basis offered for the program;204 changes made to the
Defense Department’s use of Threat and Local Observation Notice reports,
or TALON reports, after a Department of Defense Inspector General
investigation into whether the reports complied with intelligence laws and
department regulations;205 changes to the Justice Department’s “hold until
cleared” detention policy after an inspector general investigation into
individual allegations of detainee abuse;206 and the establishment of tighter
cybersecurity standards for supply chain vendors after a Department of
Defense inspector general report on vulnerabilities.207 Ongoing Department
2019, 1:17 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/09/inspector-generalsreport-russia-key-takeaways-079030 [https://perma.cc/E4S9-58H9]; Elizabeth
Goitein, et al., Top Experts Analyze Inspector General Report Finding Problems in
FBI Surveillance, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69
879/top-experts-analyze-inspector-general-report-finding-problems-in-fbi-surveilla
nce/ [https://perma.cc/3F3F-YHDL]; Garret M. Graff, So Much for the Deep State
Plot Against Donald Trump, WIRED (Dec. 9, 2019, 3:44 PM), https://www.
wired.com/story/ig-report-fbi-trump-deep-state/
[https://perma.cc/5D9V-98LU];
David Kris, Further Thoughts on the Crossfire Hurricane Report, LAWFARE (Dec.
23, 2019, 4:19 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/further-thoughts-crossfirehurricane-report [https://perma.cc/82B5-CGQZ].
204. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., CENT. INTEL. AGENCY,
COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES (SEPTEMBER
2001 - OCTOBER 2003) 1–2 (2004) https://fas.org/irp/cia/product/ig-interrog.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48AW-YSV8]; Sinnar, supra note 157, at 1047–49 (“Despite the
renewed legal authority for enhanced interrogations, the CIA claims that it has not
waterboarded any detainees since 2003, and some commentators have credited the
inspector general investigation for the cessation of the practice.”).
205. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., THE THREAT AND
LOCAL OBSERVATION NOTICE (TALON) REPORT PROGRAM 8–9 (2007),
https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/1118727/the-threat-and-local-observati
on-notice-talon-report-program-redacted/ [https://perma.cc/5S5N-EG27]; Sinnar,
supra note 157, at 1043.
206. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11
ATTACKS 195 (2003), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/special/0306/
full.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJJ4-W8GR]; Sinnar, supra note 157, at 1043.
207. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY OF
REPORTS ISSUED REGARDING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBERSECURITY FROM
JULY 1, 2019 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2020, at ii (2020), https://media.defense.gov/2020/
Dec/15/2002552095/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2021-034.PDF [https://perma.cc/XA73-DBT
V]; OFF. OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION & SUSTAINMENT
CYBERSECURITY MATURITY MODEL CERTIFICATION, https://www.acq.osd.mil/
cmmc/ [https://perma.cc/66KE-CMNK] (last visited Aug. 28, 2021); HEIDI M.
PETERS, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: DOD’S CYBERSECURITY MATURITY MODEL
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of Justice inspector general reviews of the use of federal law enforcement
personnel in responding to protest activity and civil unrest during the
summer of 2020 in Washington, DC and in Portland, Oregon208 are likely to
lead to policy revisions as well. Further evidence of this growing role can
be found in the ability of inspectors general to impact management and
strategic funding decisions.209
It bears noting of course, that this shift from inspectors general
assessing whether the agency followed the applicable legal requirement to a
scenario where the inspector general assesses the content of the applicable
law, policy, or agency regulation, is not a welcome development in all
corners.210 However, inspectors general are not policymakers, so there is a
limit to their influence. As noted above, inspectors general serve only in an
advisory role and they must rely on their agency heads or Congress to take
corrective action for any violations or problematic conduct they identify.211
Nonetheless, this shift has occurred and it is critical to appreciate how this
shift in responsibility – from identifying waste and misstatement to being
the “fount of accountability” – will affect the potential for a larger role for
inspectors general in evaluating the efficacy and substance of various
cybersecurity policies. This shift, and the illustrations above, reveal that
inspectors general are a good resource for illuminating the policies in need
of change, and thus, may be able to provide a roadmap for effective
organizational reform in the area of cybersecurity.

CERTIFICATION FRAMEWORK (2020), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R46
643.html [https://perma.cc/7P5D-BGXE]; Dawn E. Stern, Into the Unknown:
DoD’s Long-awaited Cybersecurity Rule Leaves Critical Questions Unanswered,
LEXOLOGY (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=fbf417
83-86c9-456e-8418-9241ccf5fa46 [https://perma.cc/98FG-KMZC]; Lucas Truax,
The Department of Defense Is Serious About Cybersecurity, LINKEDIN PULSE (Mar.
25, 2020), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/department-defense-serious-cybersecur
ity-lucas-truax/ [https://perma.cc/E2DM-2VSW].
208. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., DOJ OIG Announces Initiation of
Work (July 23, 2020), available at https://oig.justice.gov/news/doj-oig-announcesinitiation-work [https://perma.cc/R6A3-B5J9].
209. Memorandum from Patrick E. McFarland, Inspector Gen., U.S. Off. of
Pers. Mgmt., to Beth F. Cobert, Acting Director, U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., at 1
(July 22, 2015), https://www.opm.gov/our-inspector-general/publications/specialreports-and-reviews/serious-concerns-regarding-the-office-of-the-chief-information
-officer.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RAM-37WT].
210. See Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security
Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 112, 113–14 (2015) (arguing
that inspectors general should focus on compliance, not content).
211. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 2, 3, 4.
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D. Congressional Information Conduit
Finally, inspectors general are well positioned to support reform
efforts due to their statutorily-mandated congressional reporting
requirements. While much of the inspector general attention and
scholarship focuses on the internal oversight function, the inspector general
position serves a secondary, although equally important, role in support of
congressional oversight efforts by serving as a conduit of information to
congressional committees.212 As noted above, Congress established the
offices of inspectors general in each of the executive branch agencies “to
provide a means for keeping the head of the establishment and the
Congress fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies
relating to the administration of such programs and operations and the
necessity for and progress of corrective action. . . .”213 As such, in contrast
to agency employees who often view the inspector general as an
exasperating junkyard dog, the congressional committees have a kinder
view of inspectors general, relying on them to provide oversight support as
well as access to information that would otherwise be difficult to acquire
from the executive branch, categorizing the inspectors general more as
man’s–or committee’s–best friend.
Inspectors general fulfil this informing task through a variety of
mechanisms, some generally applicable and some specific to the agency’s
cybersecurity and information security responsibilities. These mechanisms
include semi-annual reports mandated by the IGA, implementation updates,
fast action reports for particularly egregious violations and the threat of
seven-day letters, joint biennial reports relating to the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act, annual reports mandated by Federal Information
Security Management Act (FISMA), requests for inspector general
testimony, and by responding to specific inquiries from Congress. While
the inspector general may not publicly disclose information that is
prohibited from disclosure due to classification level or for other reasons,214
most of the inspector general reports are published both on the agency
website and the consortium’s page.215 This section will briefly review each
212. Id. § 2.
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(e); see also 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4(e).
215. OVERSIGHT.GOV, https://www.oversight.gov/ [https://perma.cc/NYH4-Q
FJJ] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021); Reports, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T
OF DEF., https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/ [https://perma.cc/GY5B-TCME] (last
visited Feb. 28, 2021); Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations, OFF. OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.oig.dhs.gov/reports/
audits-inspections-and-evaluations [https://perma.cc/BG2U-TNUQ] (last visited
Feb. 28, 2021); Reports, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://oig.justice.gov/reports [https://perma.cc/8YXJ-3NHH] (last visited Feb. 28,
2021).
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of these mechanisms, taking particular note of each mechanism’s ability to
provide information relating to the U.S. government’s cybersecurity
practices.
1. Semi-Annual Reports
Section 5 of the IGA requires semi-annual reports “summarizing
the activities of the Office during the immediately preceding six-month
periods ending March 31 and September 30.”216 The reports must be
submitted to the agency head by April 30 and October 31 of each year.217
The list of required components is comprehensive, and includes the
following notable categories among a list of twenty-two other components:
a description of “significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to
the administration of programs and operations” at the agency; a description
of recommendations for “corrective action”; a summary of matters referred
to prosecutive authorities and resulting prosecutions and convictions; a
summary of each report made to the head of the establishment under section
6(c)(2); statistical tables showing the total number of audit, inspection, and
evaluation reports, and the total dollar value of questioned costs; reports of
“outstanding unimplemented recommendations”; information concerning
“any significant management decision with which the Inspector General is
in disagreement”; and “a detailed description of any instance of
whistleblower retaliation.”218
Upon receiving the report, the agency head must transmit the report
within thirty days to the appropriate congressional committees or subcommittees and the IG’s report must be accompanied by a report of the
agency head commenting on and responding to certain aspects of the IG’s
report.219 Within sixty days of submitting the semi-annual report to
Congress, the agency head “shall make copies of such report available to
the public upon request and at a reasonable cost,”220 and in most instances
the reports are published on the website of the inspector general or the
agency or the central inspector general report repository at oversight.gov.
2. Flagrant Incident Reports and Seven-Day Letters
The inspector general is subject to an additional heightened
reporting requirement for “particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses,
or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations” in
the agency.221 When the inspector general becomes aware of a matter in this
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5.
Id.
Id. § 5(a).
Id. § 5(b).
Id. § 5(c).
Id. § 5(d).
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category, the inspector general must report the matter immediately to the
head of agency.222 The burden then shifts to the agency head to transmit
such report to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of Congress
within seven calendar days.223 Referred to as “seven-day letters” in
inspector general lingo, the potential to swing this sword provides critical
leverage to the office of the inspector general.224 Indeed, that potential
leverage may account for the sparing use of this tool. According to a 2011
GAO study, between 2008 and 2010, only one inspector general issued a
seven-day letter, and between January 1990 and April 1998, no seven-day
letters were issued.225 Recognizing the value of the information provided by
inspectors general, particularly with regard to issues of immediate concern,
Congress has encouraged inspectors general to use the seven-day letter in a
less sparing fashion.226
3. Implementation Updates
In addition to the semi-annual and incident-specific reports,
inspectors general must now track and provide to Congress and the public
on an annual basis the implementation status of their prior
recommendations.227 The purpose underlying the requirement is “to ensure
that the inspectors general avoid overstating the actual savings that can be
attributed to their work.”228 The implementation status check provides a

222. Id.
223. Id.
224. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-770, INSPECTORS GENERAL:
REPORTING ON INDEPENDENCE, EFFECTIVENESS, AND EXPERTISE 8 (2011).
225. Id.
226. Timothy R. Smith, Darrell Issa Wants Inspectors General to Loop in
Congress on Big Investigations, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2012), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/post/darrell-issa-wants-inspectors-gen
eral-to-loop-in-congress-on-big-investigations/2012/08/06/22b53364-dfdc-11e1-a4
21-8bf0f0e5aa11_blog.html [https://perma.cc/KVK5-G3RP]. See, e.g., Letter from
Charles J. Sheehan, Acting Inspector Gen., U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, to Andrew R.
Wheeler,
Adm’r,
U.S.
Env’t Prot.
Agency (Oct.
29,
2019),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-11/documents/_epaoig_7dayletter
_11-6-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CST-72UT].
227. U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a)(15) (resulting from the 1988 amendments); see e.g.,
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
OIG’S TOP UNIMPLEMENTED RECOMMENDATIONS: SOLUTIONS TO REDUCE FRAUD,
WASTE AND ABUSE IN HHS PROGRAMS (2021), https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-andpublications/compendium/files/compendium2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZB8-KY5
C].
228. 133 CONG. REC. S4554-01, at 7958–59 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1987) (statement
of Rep. Glenn) (“The bill requires more detailed statistical analysis from the
inspectors general and requires periodic reporting to Congress by the agency heads
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useful tool for agency heads, relevant congressional committees, and the
public to identify areas of persistently weak cybersecurity as well as
possible foot dragging by agencies.
4. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Biennial Reports
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 requires
inspectors general of the “appropriate Federal entities,” defined as the
Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice,
and the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI), “in consultation with the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community and the Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight,”
to provide joint biennial reports to Congress by December 18 of every other
year.229 The reports include an assessment of each agency’s implementation
of the act’s statutory requirements.230 The Office of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community compiles the results in a report, an unclassified
version is published,231 and a separate, classified report232 is provided to the
appropriate congressional committees and officials. These annual reports
offer a rich assessment of cybersecurity issues, some of which are agency
or program specific, but many that cross agencies.233 As such, these reports
provide a roadmap rich with guidance on the problem spots and areas in
need of urgent attention. Far from a mere compliance exercise, these reports
provide a helpful prioritization tool for revamping the government’s
cybersecurity framework.

on their implementation of recommended corrective action. This means savings
will be realized and reported when such action is completed.”).
229. 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1506(b).
230. Id. § 1506(b); see, e.g., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., INTEL. CMTY.,
UNCLASSIFIED JOINT REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CYBERSECURITY
INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015 (2019), https://www.oversight.gov/sites/
default/files/oig-reports/Unclassified%2020191219_AUD-2019-005-U_Joint%20
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXU2-2983].
231. The most recent version of the joint report was submitted in December
2019. Joint Report on CISA, supra note 192.
232. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., INTEL. CMTY., JOINT REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015
(2019), https://www.dodig.mil/Reports/Audits-and-Evaluations/Article/2048074/
unclassified-joint-report-on-the-implementation-of-the-cybersecurity-information/
[https://perma.cc/JXX8-5GJH].
233. Id.; see, e.g., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., INTEL. CMTY., UNCLASSIFIED
JOINT REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION
SHARING ACT OF 2015 (2019), https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oigreports/Unclassified%2020191219_AUD-2019-005-U_Joint%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DXU2-2983].
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5. Federal Information Security Act (FISMA) Annual Reports
An annual reporting requirement also stems from the Federal
Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), which requires
the inspector general for each affected agency to review their agency’s
information security program for compliance with the act’s requirements.234
FISMA requires the agency inspector general to perform an annual
independent evaluation of the agency’s information security programs and
practices.235 The evaluation includes testing the effectiveness of information
security policies, procedures, and practices of a representative subset of
agency systems.236 These reports are a rich source of insight, identifying
agencies with persistently weak cybersecurity while also providing a
standard for comparative analysis. Recent reports show continuing
challenges in the areas of supply chain controls, upgrades, employee
training, and workforce development.237
6. Specific Investigation Requests
In addition to the reports described above, members of Congress
may also request specific action by inspectors general.238 This authority is
described in 5 U.S.C. § App. 3 § 5(e)(4).239 An example from November
2020 can be found in a request to the Department of Defense inspector
general from members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Senate Armed Services Committee to investigate then-President
Trump’s recent appointment to the position of general counsel for the

234. 44 U.S.C. § 3555(b)(1) (“for each agency with an Inspector General
appointed under the Inspector General Act of 1978, the annual evaluation required
by this section shall be performed by the Inspector General or by an independent
external auditor, as determined by the Inspector General of the agency”).
235. Id.
236. 44 U.S.C. § 3555(a).
237. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, EVALUATION OF DHS’ INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2020, (2021), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/202110/OIG-21-72-Sep21.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JPZ-TXNV]; OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FISCAL YEAR 2021 IRS FEDERAL
INFORMATION SECURITY MODERNIZATION ACT EVALUATION (2021),
https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/TIGTA/202120072fr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R86R-CUVJ]; OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERAN’S AFFAIRS, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY MODERNIZATION ACT
AUDIT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 (2021), https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/
files/oig-reports/VA/VAOIG-20-01927-104.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A6K-J27Y].
238. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(e)(4).
239. Id.
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National Security Agency.240 Additional examples are found arising from
the SolarWinds hack, which has been the subject of several specific
requests to agency inspector general offices, including one from
Representatives Bill Pascrell and Mike Kelly who reached out to the
inspector general for the Internal Revenue Service.241 Admirably, the
inspector general responded within a few days.242 A slew of additional
requests followed, including to the inspectors general of the Department of
Justice and Department of Homeland Security.243

240. Letter from Mark R. Warner, Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Comm.
on Intel., and Jack Reed, Ranking Member of the Comm. on Armed Servs., to Sean
O’Donnell, Acting Inspector Gen. for the Dep’t of Def. (Nov. 16, 2020),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20407603/dod-ig-letter.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/9FND-RGKX]. Another example of requests from members is an October
28, 2021 letter from Senators Rob Portman, James Lankford, and M. Michael
Rounds. They ask the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General Joseph
Cuffari to investigate reports that the TSA and CISA “failed to give adequate
consideration to feedback from stakeholders and subject matter experts” in
announcing new cybersecurity directives and in the process of drafting new
regulations. Letter from Rob Portman, Ranking Member of the Comm. On
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affs., James Lankford, Ranking Member of the
Subcomm. on Gov’t Operations and Border Mgmt., and M. Michael Rounds,
Senator, to Joseph Cuffari, Inspector General (Oct. 28, 2021),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2021-10-28%20RP%20Lankford%2
0Rounds%20to%20Cuffari%20re%20TSA%20Security%20Directives.pdf?utm_ca
mpaign=wp_the_cybersecurity_202&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_source=
newsletter&amp;wpisrc=nl_cybersecurity202 [https://perma.cc/55YD-U8BR].
241. Dave Nyczepir, “No Evidence” IRS Taxpayer Information Exposed by
SolarWinds Hack, FEDSCOOP (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.fedscoop.com/
taxpayer-information-solarwinds-hack-irs/ [https://perma.cc/T495-J5C3].
242. Letter from J. Russell George, Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., to Rep.
Bill Pascrell, Chairman of the H.R. Subcomm. on Oversight, and Rep. Mike Kelly,
Ranking Member of the H.R. Subcomm. on Oversight (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://pascrell.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ways_and_means_response_final_12-232020.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ6K-367Q].
243. Press Release, Jerry Moran, Senator, Senators Request Information from
FBI, CISA on Reports of Russian Cyberattack Against the U.S. Government (Dec.
15, 2020), https://www.moran.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/12/senators-requ
est-information-from-fbi-cisa-on-reports-of-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-u-sgovernment [https://perma.cc/X266-W36P] (“How has CISA and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) organized their coordination efforts with the
impacted federal agencies to support forensic analysis and investigative efforts
related to unauthorized access? What role do the federal agencies or their
Inspectors General play in the investigations?”).
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7. Congressional Testimony
Anticipating the need for congressional support, many offices of
inspector general have a division or position dedicated to legislative affairs
and tasked with preparing the semi-annual reports and otherwise serving as
liaisons between the office and the relevant congressional committees.244 In
addition, inspectors general are well-positioned to complement the work of
the Governmental Accountability Office, which serves as a resource to
congressional staffers and members.245 Recent testimony by inspectors
general include the following: “Oversight of the United States Capitol
Police and Preparations for and Response to the Attack of January 6th”
(April 21, 2021);246 “Department of Defense Inspector General and the
Services Inspector Generals: Roles, Responsibilities and Opportunities for

244. See e.g., Legislative Affairs and Communications, OFF. OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.dodig.mil/About/Offices/
Legislative-Affairs-and-Communications/ [https://perma.cc/LX8X-4M69] (last
visited July 17, 2021).
245. The GAO and inspectors general have a history of working together on
various projects, as both focus on supporting Congress’ oversight efforts. Indeed,
the relationship is a complicated one as the GAO also audits each agency’s office
of inspector general to ensure they are meeting the statutory mission. A recent
example of this can be found in the GAO’s report on the work of the Office of
Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-452T, DHS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL:
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON LONG-STANDING MANAGEMENT AND
OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES (2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-452t.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6SXP-KTJ7]; see also Oversight of the Department. of Homeland
Security’s Office of Inspector General: Hearing Before the Comm. On Homeland
Sec., 117th Cong. (Apr. 21, 2021), https://homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/
oversight-of-the-department-of-homeland-securitys-office-of-inspector-general
[https://perma.cc/CRU7-U939]; Nick Schwellenbach & Adam Zagorin, Pulling
Punches: Trump-Appointed Watchdog Suppressed White House-Related Probes,
POGO (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2021/04/pullingpunches-trump-appointed-watchdog-suppressed-white-house-related-probes/
[https://perma.cc/4M2Q-GFP8].
246. Oversight of the United States Capitol Police and Preparations for and
Response to the Attack of January 6th: Hearing Before the Comm. on House
Admin., 117th Cong. (Apr. 21, 2021), https://cha.house.gov/committeeactivity/hearings/oversight-united-states-capitol-police-and-preparations-andresponse [https://perma.cc/YE8J-NN5H].
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Improvement” (April 15, 2021);247 and “Restoring Independence of
Inspectors General” (April 20, 2021).248
E. Interagency Models (CIGIE, ICIG Forum, and FIORC)
Finally, there are three IG-established partnership entities that can
provide insight on the U.S. government cybersecurity organizational reform
efforts. The first of these is the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency (CIGIE).249 The council was established in the Inspector
General Reform Act of 2008 as an independent entity within the executive
branch.250 Its mission is to “address integrity, economy and effectiveness
issues that transcend individual Government agencies and aid in the
establishment of a professional, well-trained and highly skilled workforce
in the Offices of Inspectors General.”251 CIGIE is responsible for operating
and maintaining oversight.gov, a “publicly accessibly, searchable website
containing the latest public reports” from inspectors general across the
federal government.252 Of interest to the cybersecurity organizational task is
the entity’s ability to look across agencies and to offer insight on crosscutting challenges. Each year, the council prepares a report that identifies
management and performance challenges facing multiple federal
agencies.253

247. Department of Defense Inspector General and the Services Inspector
Generals: Roles, Responsibilities and Opportunities for Improvement: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Mil. Personnel, H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 117th Cong.
(2021), https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings?ID=8B79E0CA-6761-4213-A0B
A-142C740D040F [https://perma.cc/A2PE-GYTT].
248. Press Release, H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, Subcomm. Comm.
Held Hearing on Restoring Indep. of Inspectors Gen. (Apr. 20, 2021),
https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/subcommittee-committee-heldhearing-on-restoring-independence-of-inspectors [https://perma.cc/955Z-LWU8].
249. What is CIGIE?, COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND
EFFICIENCY, https://www.ignet.gov/ [https://perma.cc/MV9P-YD4R] (last visited
July 17, 2021).
250. Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, 122 Stat.
4306 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. § 11).
251. Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency,
OVERSIGHT.GOV, https://www.oversight.gov/inspectors-general/council-inspectorsgeneral-integrity-and-efficiency [https://perma.cc/6NGD-BW4Q] (last visited May
12, 2021).
252. About Oversight.gov, OVERSIGHT.GOV (last visited July 17, 2021),
https://www.oversight.gov/about [https://perma.cc/S764-V9KU].
253. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND
EFFICIENCY, TOP MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES FACING
MULTIPLE FEDERAL AGENCIES (Feb. 2021), https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/
files/untracked/TMPC_report_02022021.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4LH-HHML].
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The second partnership is the Intelligence Community Inspectors
General Forum, which was established in 2010.254 The forum's “mission is
to promote and further collaboration, cooperation and coordination among
the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community of the United
States.”255 The forum is led by the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community (commonly referred to as the IC IG), and it includes
representatives from inspector general offices in the Central Intelligence
Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Defense Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Justice,
Department of State, Department of the Treasury, National Geospatial
Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, and
Federal Bureau of Investigation.256 Forum members meet quarterly and its
activities focus on:
Supporting the IC IGs in the performance of audits,
inspections, evaluations and investigations within their
respective departments and agencies; [s]trengthening the
collective role and effectiveness of IG's throughout the
Intelligence Community and to enhance the value of IGs’
activities in support of the National Intelligence Strategy;
and [a]chieving optimal utilization of resources, to increase
efficiency and to avoid duplication of effort among the
Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community.257
The third entity is the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review
Council (FIORC). This partnership builds on the existing Five Eyes
relationship, an alliance among the intelligence entities in
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. It includes the following oversight entities: the Office of the
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security of Australia; the National
Security and Intelligence Review Agency of Canada; the Office of the
Intelligence Commissioner of Canada; the Commissioner of Intelligence
Warrants and the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and
Security of New Zealand; the Investigatory Powers Commissioner's Office
of the United Kingdom; and the Office of the Inspector General of the

254. ICIG FAQs, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., https://www.dni.gov/
index.php/who-we-are/organizations/icig/icig-about-us/icig-faqs#:~:text=The%20
statutory%20ICIG%20Forum%20was,oversight%20responsibilities%20for%20IC
%20elements [https://perma.cc/66PZ-WPN9] (last visited May 12, 2021).
255. IC Inspectors General Forum, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL.,
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/organizations/icig/icig-features/367
[https://perma.cc/6EE9-BJCG] (last visited May 12, 2021).
256. Id.
257. Id.
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Intelligence Community of the United States.258 According to the council’s
charter signed in 2017, it was established to provide a forum for council
members to: “exchange views on subjects of mutual interest and concern;
compare best practices in review and oversight methodology; explore areas
where cooperation on reviews and the sharing of results is permitted where
appropriate; encourage transparency to the largest extent possible to
enhance public trust; and maintain contact with political offices, oversight
and review committees, and non-Five Eyes countries as appropriate.”259
As demonstrated in the paragraphs above, the work of inspectors
general is essential to the cybersecurity reorganization mission and of
particular importance to the task of developing a cohesive cybersecurity
strategy that avoids duplication and waste. Inspectors general are well
positioned to support the cybersecurity reorganizational effort due to their
roles as independent advisors; their ability to occupy a special perch within
their agencies; their evolving capacity as policy evaluators; Congress’s
increasing reliance on inspectors general for information; and existing
interagency models that anticipates the need for cross-agency coordination
in addressing cybersecurity challenges. To better understand the role of
inspectors general and their contributions to the U.S. government’s
cybersecurity reform efforts, the next section will catalog the recent
activities of inspectors general in support of these efforts.
IV. UTILIZING INSPECTOR GENERAL WORK PRODUCT TO SUPPORT THE
CYBERSECURITY REORGANIZATION PROJECT
While few have noticed the contributions of inspectors general in
this space, the inspectors general have continued with their work, quietly
but thoroughly assessing and evaluating the cybersecurity accomplishments
and failings of their agencies, and making recommendations for
improvements both at the programmatic and larger structural levels. To get
a sense of the breadth and scope of inspector general activities in assessing
the U.S. government’s cybersecurity mission, a review of recent inspector
general reports proves illuminating. The table below, which is pulled from
recent semiannual or other summary reports and focuses on inspector
general offices in agencies with significant cyber responsibilities, provides
a revealing roadmap of the organizational work ahead:

258. CHARTER OF THE FIVE EYES INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW
COUNCIL (FIORC) (Oct. 2, 2017) https://www.dni.gov/files/ICIG/Documents/
Partnerships/FIORC/Signed%20FIORC%20Charter%20with%20Line.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9DYR-8ZG9].
259. Id. ¶ 2.
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Agency

Selected Inspector General Reports260

Office of the
Inspector
General of
the
Intelligence
Community

Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (January
2020)

261

ODNI’s Oversight of Intelligence Community Major
Systems Acquisition Cybersecurity Risks (November
2019)
Assessment of IC Information System Deterrence,
Detection, and Mitigation of Insider Threats (March 2018)
Audit of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Implementation of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing
Act, section 107(b), Oversight of Government Activities
for Calendar Years 2019 and 2020262 (date to be
determined)
Joint Project on the Implementation of the Cybersecurity
Information Act, Section 107(b), Oversight of
Government Activities for Calendar Years 2019 and
2020263 (date to be determined)

260. The reports referenced in the table are collected primarily from the semiannual reports provided to Congress, the annual work plans prepared for agency
heads, and from the inspector general report database available at OVERSIGHT.GOV,
https://www.oversight.gov/reports [https://perma.cc/JWM6-G8JK]. Excluded from
this table are the annual FISMA audits conducted by each agency’s inspector
general office.
261. The reports listed for the Office of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community were gathered from semi-annual reports, annual work
plans, and other reports available on OVERSIGHT.GOV, https://www.oversight.gov/
reports [https://perma.cc/JWM6-G8JK].
262. This report is described as a “required” project in OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., INTEL. CMTY, ANNUAL WORKPLAN FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2021, at 4 (2021),
https://www.dni.gov/files/ICIG/Documents/Publications/Annual%20Work%
20Plan/IC%20IG%20Annual%20Work%20Plan%20FY21.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/N2DR-6NN2].
263. This report is described as a “required” project in OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., INTEL. CMTY, ANNUAL WORKPLAN FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2021, at 4 (2021),
https://www.dni.gov/files/ICIG/Documents/Publications/Annual%20Work
%20Plan/IC%20IG%20Annual%20Work%20Plan%20FY21.pdf
[https://perma.
cc/N2DR-6NN2].
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Evaluation of the Intelligence Communities’ Information
Technology Supply Chain264 Fiscal Year 2020
Independent Evaluation of the Office (date to be
determined)
Office
of
Inspector
General for
the
Department
of Homeland
Security265

Evaluation of DHS’s Information Security Program for
Fiscal Year 2019 (September 2020)
DHS Made Limited Progress to Improve Information
Sharing Under the Cybersecurity Act in CYs 2017 and
2018 (September 2020)
DHS Faces Challenges in Meeting the Responsibilities for
the Geospatial Data Act of 2018 (September 2020)
Review of CBP's Major Cybersecurity Incident During a
2019 Biometric Pilot (September 2020)
Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems
for Fiscal Year 2019 – Secret (September 2020)
Progress and Challenges in Modernizing DHS’ IT
Systems and Infrastructure (August 2020)
DHS Needs to Improve Cybersecurity Workforce
Planning (September 2019)
DHS Can Strengthen Its Cyber Mission Coordination
Efforts (September 2015)

Office of the Audit of Maintaining Cybersecurity in the Coronavirus
Inspector
Disease – 2019 Telework Environment (March 2021)
General for
the
Audit of Cybersecurity Requirements for Weapon

264. This report is described as a “discretionary” project in OFF. OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., INTEL. CMTY, ANNUAL WORKPLAN FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2021,
at 7 (2021), https://www.dni.gov/files/ICIG/Documents/Publications/Annual%20
Work%20Plan/IC%20IG%20Annual%20Work%20Plan%20FY21.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/N2DR-6NN2].
265. The reports listed for the Office of Inspector General for the Department
of Homeland Security were gathered from semi-annual reports, annual work plans,
and other reports available on OVERSIGHT.GOV, https://www.oversight.gov/reports
[https://perma.cc/JWM6-G8JK].

228
Department
of Defense266
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Systems in Operations and Support of Phase of
Development of Defense Acquisition in Life Cycle
(February 2021)
Summary of Reports Issued Regarding Department of
Defense Cybersecurity from July 1, 2019, through June
30, 2020 (December 2020)
Audit of Protection of DoD Controlled Unclassified
Information on Contractor-Owned Networks and Systems
(July 2019)
Audit of the DoD’s Management of the Cybersecurity
Risks for Government Purchase Card Purchases of
Commercial Off-the-Shelf Items (July 2019) (full report is
classified)
DoD Actions Taken to Implement the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015 (November 2018) (full
report is FOUO)
Control Systems Supporting Tier I Task Critical Assets
Lacked Basic Cybersecurity Controls (June 2017) (full
report is classified)

Office of the
Inspector
General for
the
Department
of
Commerce267

Failures in the Department’s Security Program Resulted in
Exposure of Sensitive Trade Information to Unvetted
Foreign Nationals (February 2020)
The Department Needs to Improve Its Capability to
Effectively Share Cyber Threat Information (September
2019)
Inadequate Management of Active Directory Puts
USPTO’s Mission at Significant Cyber Risk (June 2019)
The Census Bureau Must Improve Its Implementation of

266. The reports listed for the Office of Inspector General for the Department
of Defense were gathered from semi-annual reports, annual work plans, and other
reports available on OVERSIGHT.GOV, https://www.oversight.gov/reports [https://
perma.cc/JWM6-G8JK].
267. The reports listed for the Office of Inspector General for the Department
of Commerce were gathered from semi-annual reports, annual work plans, and
other reports available on OVERSIGHT.GOV, https://www.oversight.gov/reports
[https://perma.cc/JWM6-G8JK].
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the Risk Management Framework (October 2018)
Review of IT Security Policies, Procedures, Practices, and
Capabilities in Accordance with the Cybersecurity Act of
2015 (August 2016)
Successful Cyber Attack Highlights Longstanding
Deficiencies in NOAA’s IT Security Program (August
2016)
Office of the
Inspector
General for
the
Department
of
Energy268

Management Letter on the Department of Energy’s
Unclassified Cybersecurity Program for Fiscal Year 2019
(March 2020)
Management of Cybersecurity over Selected Information
Systems at Department of Energy Headquarters
(September 2019)
Management of Cybersecurity Activities at a Department
of Energy Site (August 2019)
Management of a Department
Cybersecurity Program (July 2019)

of

Energy

Site

As shown in the table above, the inspector general offices in the
agencies with the most regular contact with cybersecurity issues already are
addressing the most pressing of the government’s organizational issues.
Synthesizing these reports uncovers valuable insight into the following
aspects of the need for cybersecurity reorganization: the effectiveness (or
lack thereof) of information sharing agreements between government
agencies and with the private sector (including the sharing of cyber threat
information); assessments of cybersecurity coordination efforts among
federal civilian agencies; after-action reports on cyber incidents or data
breaches; effectiveness of cyber workforce development programs;
identification of vulnerabilities in federal information systems; and a
cataloging of unimplemented cybersecurity recommendations from years
past. Indeed, this last item may be the most helpful takeaway as it provides
a list of cybersecurity tasks to be done. When paired with the FISMA
audits, the observations and recommendations included in the inspector
268. The reports listed for the Office of Inspector General for the Department
of Energy were gathered from semi-annual reports, annual work plans, and other
reports available on OVERSIGHT.GOV, https://www.oversight.gov/reports [https://
perma.cc/JWM6-G8JK].
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general reports offer a roadmap for the U.S. government’s cybersecurity
organizational reform efforts.
CONCLUSION
This article examined the unheralded and unrecognized work of
inspectors general, and the special role they are poised to play in the U.S.
government’s cybersecurity-related work in the coming years. This role will
build on their ability to serve as key advisors to the agency head, their role
as conduits of information to Congress, their already-established
interagency mechanisms for flagging cross-cutting programs, and their
special perch within the agency’s day to day transactions which provides an
operational understanding of the strengths and weakness of the
government’s cybersecurity architecture.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to identify the exact
contours and curves of the future role to be played by inspectors general in
the government’s cybersecurity organization reforms, the following
observations provide considerations for additional study. Future work
should consider the mechanisms for taking advantage of the unique
contributions of the inspectors general, the optimal ways to channel the
contributions of inspectors general, and to assess the extent to which
inspectors general should be engaged in organizational change. Options
may include the creation of a special cybersecurity-focused inspector
general, focused on a temporary and single task relating to the
government’s cybersecurity programs and efforts, or the establishment of
an inspector general forum focused on cybersecurity mandates, and
building on the model established by the IC IG Forum or CIGIE
partnerships. While the newly-established National Cyber Director will
have plenty of suggestions for cybersecurity organizational reform, that
individual would do well to consider the contributions of the inspectors
general to future reform efforts. Indeed, a review of the most recent
inspector general reports on cybersecurity-related matters will provide an
effective roadmap for sorting and prioritizing reform efforts, and for
accomplishing substantive and sustainable reform.

